Preface

Contemporary scholars who still believe there is much to be learned from the great arguments of the past - indeed that they are absolutely prerequisite to any concrete comprehension of modern freedom - find themselves swimming against a tide of conventional wisdom that is systematically hostile to the whole speculative legacy. The seeds of a contrary, ultra-philosophical thinking have grown to full maturity. It has become a point of intellectual correctness to presume that the history of western thought is to be viewed as nothing more than a series of "meta-narratives" whose real purpose was quite other than they proposed - to conceal some ideological prejudice, perhaps, or dignify linguistic distortions by dressing them in pseudo-theoretical garb.

The ultra-modernist siege against the citadel of philosophy would now appear to have been somewhat lifted as the radical critique of the western tradition has taken a distinctly skeptical turn and no longer speaks of a final conquest of the legacy of speculative thought, only of its intellectual suspension. Perhaps the time has come to begin to recover its original sense.

This first issue of Animus shows how the original sense of various classical arguments has been missed or trivialized by assimilation to ultra-modernist conceptions. The first essay surveys the 19th and 20th century seen as a single project specifically aimed at the radical critique of the thinking standpoint of philosophy, a project Jackson argues has reached its denouement in post-modern thought. In the aftermath of its attempt skeptically to nullify the philosophical spirit the recovery of that spirit itself and what it has actually accomplished becomes urgent. The four following articles draw upon the Greek speculative tradition to show how, working from ultra-modern assumptions, later interpretations of key themes and arguments have obscured and even obliterated their original sense.

Thus Andrews reviews the presumption of using modern truth-functional logic to analyze and correct elements of Aristotle's logic; she shows how important logical distinctions have been altogether lost in attempts to transpose them into the classical Russellian mode. In a timely riposte to Derrida's para-Freudian reading of Antigone, Epstein next makes the case that "the Nietzschean view of tragedy as showing the identity of the particular individual with 'being' cannot withstand the examination of a play central to the tragic world"; his analysis demonstrates how the essentially speculative intent of Greek art is entirely corrupted in attempts to reduce it to non-speculative post-modern terms. House's article considers the long-standing and current misrepresentation of Aristotle as the "earth-bound empiricist" who debased the pure gold of Plato's idealism into his own bio-materialist currency; House enlists the texts to show how the Platonic idealism, far from confuted in Aristotle's criticism, is indeed completed in it. Finally, Johnston distinguishes Augustine's concept of time from the Plotinian, and in this essentially shows Augustine as beyond Neoplatonism.
The common method followed is to argue classical positions from their own principles rather than, as is the prevailing custom, from later ones. The aim is restore some sense of what has been accomplished already in philosophy. In the next issue the focus will be on similar issues seen from a contemporary perspective. The whole interest of Animus is to encourage the rebuilding of the ruined bridges that link contemporary thought to its own origins, a task which requires construction from both sides of the divide. For the proper outcome of the western speculative tradition is just the contemporary world itself, and the principle of freedom that informs it has no other source than in that very same tradition. Any whose habit is to damn modernity in defense of the philosophical tradition, or who takes as gospel the post-modern view of the latter's final obsolescence, will find little of interest here.
Post-Modernism And The Recovery Of The Philosophical Tradition

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Introduction

As century and millennium draw to a close the paradoxical thought preoccupying philosophers is whether or how philosophy is at an end. According to the now common opinion - among many academic philosophers, indeed, a certainty - the ideal of a universal knowledge through principles, *philosophia*, has long since been exposed as spurious so that no person of right mind would nowadays recognize or indulge in it as a legitimate pursuit. For the new philosophers the fact is that "philosophy" as traditionally understood is a thinking no longer relevant for a post-modern consciousness and world; if it might still have a role it can only be in some radically attenuated sense: as writing its own obituary, clearing away of the rubble of its own ruined foundations, speculating as to what it might now mean to live and think post-philosophically.

That the philosophical legacy has become moribund would certainly appear confirmed in the universities, where the former queen of the faculties has long been deposed and the view of philosophy as an obsolete discipline is so broadly established that even full professors of philosophy are rendered mute by the question as to why it should even be taught at all, much less what its proper curriculum should be. In the general culture too the appeal to rational grounds is viewed as un-chic, if not indecent; a moralistic presumption prevails that equates the naive appeal to principles with allegiance to established religions: as indicative of an atavistic and reactionary turn of mind. In a culture that tolerates the most capricious and absurd superstitions provided they claim no more than a subjective validity, the achievement and the way of philosophy does not even garner that much respect. The popular view accords more with the judgement of Nietzsche that the philosophical outlook and spirit is not merely misguided, it is perverse.

In this light the spirit of the times might, on considerable evidence, be described as a-philosophical through and through. But it can hardly be right to deplore this state of affairs, as traditionalists tend to do, as a kind of Roman degeneration of modern culture into mere thoughtlessness and caprice. For it must also be acknowledged that in consideration of its commitment to subjective freedom and its insistence on open discourse as *sine qua non* for the acceptance of any moral, intellectual or political position - not to mention the unprecedented numbers of philosophers populating
contemporary universities - it could just as well be said that never has there been an age so thoroughly "philosophical" as is our own. Even those writers who would now claim to have at last overcome philosophical culture and its "logocentrism" are far from representing this eventuality as catastrophic; on the contrary, they herald it as the final liberation from an intellectual despotism, the emancipation of thought from all its past delusions.

Indeed it is now *de rigeur* among philosophers themselves to argue that philosophy did in fact end, with Hegel or thereabouts, and that the age when people believed in a universal, absolute knowledge, or that the actual is the rational, is long since over. So has almost everyone from Kierkegaard and Feuerbach to Rorty and Derrida argued (even Auden: "Goodbye, Plato and Hegel/ The shop is closing down..."). Thus it cannot just be a question of philosophy having somehow spontaneously withered away over the past century or so; rather the significant fact is that there has been a deliberate and resolute effort to overthrow it, and that this indeed has been the principal project of philosophy itself in the ultra-modern era. Bewailing the "decline" of philosophy is thus not quite to the point; the real challenge is to understand this ultra-modernist legacy of overthrow and the motives for it.

This is not to deny that there is something logically fishy about arguments which claim to set absolute limits to argument or a theory to end all theory, which is what the war over the end of philosophy being waged in the journals is mostly about. No less scrutable are pronouncements that we are now passing from a culture founded on intellectual principle to one that no longer is; especially when this position is argued *intellectually*. It is no doubt the paradox which prompted Lyotard to warn us that we must not view the "post-modern condition" as the dawn of some new culture to supplant the older modern one, for that would require us to give the "rationale" whereby the first is distinguished from the last, which is to contradict just what the step means to be, namely a stepping beyond all rationale-fixated culture. So if it is to be neither the advent of a new culture nor a lunge into the void, the link of post-modernity to modernity must somehow be maintained in stepping beyond it. Thus his formula: post-modernity is modernity itself in it self-negative extension.

Attempts to think the end of philosophy share the same difficulty: how it is thinkable to go beyond philosophical reason or set it in abeyance without resorting to arguments that are again philosophical. It is the Cartesian problem of how one is to think beyond thinking. One way is to construct arguments that can claim to be "persuasive" in some para-logical sense; it has become common practice since Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault *et al.* to appeal to poetic, linguistic or coercive "reasons" and even to cite these

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1 Heidegger in *The Question of Being* (New Haven 1958) also recognizes that any simple counter-metaphysical "passing over the line" is problematical, though he does not resolve it. Derrida also has argued that, though known as spurious, it is important the classical philosophical arguments not simply be set aside but continue to be taught and studied since it is only their active deconstruction that sustains a post-philosophical awareness.
as the real hidden force behind the arguments of philosophy itself. Another way is to abstain from argument altogether, as does Derrida who, when asked what he really means (vouler dire) in his books and arguments replies that he means nothing at all, which is the right answer if what one in fact "means to say" is precisely that all meaning is undecidable.

The paradox is nothing new. In various forms it has plagued the whole career of anti-philosophical thinking in its rise to predominance over the past two centuries. If that history may be described as the history of attempts to effect the definitive critique of the philosophical tradition, it is also the history of this paradox and of successive attempts to surmount it. It is the purpose hereinafter to explore this distinctively ultra-philosophical spirit and very broadly to sketch the lines of its development from its early nineteenth century origins to its current post-modern denouement. It will be argued that it is precisely the contradiction entailed in the very idea of a philosophical conquest of philosophy that has rendered all attempts to articulate it ambiguous and deficient, and that it is the same ambiguity that has provided the dialectical engine which has driven each interim stage of the argument beyond itself, forcing its restatement at a further level.

For it is only when philosophical movements reach their proper denouement that it first becomes possible to begin to understand and evaluate them within the purview of the wider history of thought. Before that, the dogmatic enthusiasm that is associated with projects still under way and whose aims are as yet unsullied and undoubted makes any real questioning of them virtually impossible. So it has been with Euro-American thought since the eclipse of the great age of modern philosophy in and after Hegel's time and, whose logic and limits only lately have begun to come into view. "Ultra-philosophy" would seem the apt term to designate the general form of the thinking peculiar to that era which, in other contexts, is often referred to as "ultra-modernity". The prefix "ultra-" has the convenient double sense of "going-beyond" and "taking-to-the-extreme", and ultra-philosophy stands in just such an ambiguous relation to the philosophy of classical modernity which it would at once overthrow, but also drive to its limit.

The common view of post-modern writers that their own perspective owes its origin to very recent insights on the part of a Rorty or Derrida is quite mistaken. The undertaking to emancipate thought from philosophy is already two centuries old and has generated a substantial legacy of its own. The earliest forms of ultra-philosophy are to be found in nineteenth century materialism or evolutionary theory, in Feuerbach's "going-beyond" of Christian theology or Schopenhauer's and Kierkegaard's subordination of speculative reason to specifically contra-rational absolutes. The 20th century saw a return to philosophy in a new key in the form of methodologies whose ostensible aim was the "reform" or "critique" of philosophy, thus again with an essentially ultra-philosophical intent. Its most recent shape is the post-modern scepticism which assumes the whole philosophical legacy to be self-discredited and which would no longer seek to go beyond

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2 Ironically, the traditional logic has long known just these arguments as modes of informal fallacy e.g. equivocation, amphibole, ad baculum etc

it or reform it, but remain sceptically poised, as it were, on its nether side.

In this its most recent mutation, however, the project of ultra-philosophy has been brought to the brink. In this sceptical form the contradiction inherent from the beginning in the idea of thinking the end of thought is escalated to suicidal intensity. For what would now be accomplished is no longer just the overthrow of philosophy but also the overthrow of the overthrow, the critique of the critique. What has come to light for post-modernism is that there can be no decisive argument to put an end to thought since all such arguments are but thinking again. The only option, then, is simply to assume outright the nullity of all argument, both philosophical or meta-philosophical, and to sustain this stand through purely sceptical-intellectual activity (which Derrida calls "deconstruction" and Rorty a neo-pragmatic "conversation") engaging extant positions of every kind and seeing them as self-invalidating while conscientiously seeking to remain position-less and inconclusive itself. But with that, the essential project of ultra-philosophy, which was to carry out the final overthrow of the philosophical legacy, is really abandoned. There is now no longer any distinction between what is to be gone beyond and the going beyond it, between the philosophical legacy or its critique. All that remains is philosophy that has become totally and purely academic, a reflection which has no content of its own beyond the endless evocation and subversion of arguments, and which "means to say" nothing beyond this exercise of a wholly negative reason.

The career of ultra-modernist thought may accordingly be delineated in three principal phases. The nineteenth century saw the advent of various doctrines that had as their common distinctive theme the dethronement of the spiritual-speculative outlook of the western tradition and its replacement with distinctly counter-speculative forms of world-explanation: a position to be designated hereinafter as "counter-philosophy". At the turn of the century new schools of philosophical inquiry appear which make it their business to disclose and correct, from a second-order, critical standpoint, what are alleged as the fatal fallacies of all western philosophy: thus "meta-philosophy". Finally the limit of ultra-philosophy is reached in the post-modernism which declares both the dogmatic and the critical forms of the opposition to philosophy self-defeating, and proposes instead to expose the whole legacy of reasoned discourse as spurious and annulled in itself - "post-philosophy". Each successive shape of the ultra-modernist thesis has its own distinctive approach to how the end of philosophy is properly to be thought; each has its unique interpretation - and indeed misinterpretation - of what it is in the speculative tradition that must be rejected; and each, in its own way runs afoul of an ineradicable paradox that plagues every step of the way.

I. Counter-Philosophy: Scientism and Absolutism

What it was that originally provoked the ultra-modernist turn in philosophy is a question that already has too many answers. From Feuerbach to the present the account of what in the older speculative tradition demanded its radical repudiation has been stated and restated in so many conflicting ways that to cleave to one or another version would
be arbitrarily to fall in with some particular school. For to accept Nietzsche's answer or Ayer's or Dewey's is thereby to reject Kierkegaard's or Marx's or Heidegger's for these are wholly contrary accounts of the matter which cannot be reconciled. What is more to the point is to go back to the beginning again to seek to understand the ultra-philosophical project as whole, as a history, and to consider how the argument takes shape, what conflicts arise and develop in it, and what is its final outcome.

The boldest, most straightforward arguments are usually those made at the beginning. The apocalyptic writers of the nineteenth century were the first to challenge the traditional modern-western account of the world and attempt to articulate entirely new perspectives considered appropriate to the emerging ultra-modernist culture with its techno-political humanism and appeal to a radical subjective freedom. There was the sense that history had "broken in two", and that the history of philosophy in particular had reached an epochal impasse in which its limits had been reached and exposed. The *ancien régime* of thinking reason was summarily jettisoned and new modes of thought proposed whose thrust was distinctively realist, non-conceptual, historical, experiential, humanistic and world-affirmative.

This counter-philosophical spirit took two chief forms: the first would abandon speculative thought altogether for a dogmatic rationalism appealing to positive, atheist and materialistic world-explanations - *scientism*; the second somewhat retained a speculative appearance but such as posited an explicitly counter-rational principle as its object and theme - *absolutism*. Scientism set in opposition to the spiritual-speculative view of the world - to "metaphysics" - another derived from one or other of the finite sciences, elevated to the rank of a philosophy-surrogate; thus sociology (Comte), politics (Feuerbach), psychology (Mill), biology (Spencer) or physics (Mach). Absolutism would still make its case as philosophy, even as metaphysics, though as inverse metaphysics, centring on a notion of being or "ultimate reality" as in itself irrational, self-oppositional and paradoxical, a perpetually self-reflexive "absolute-finite" in principle destructive of every objective stability. In this is expressed again, in another way, the basic thesis of counter-philosophy: namely that it is the finite self-consciousness and world that is really absolute, a view which Schopenhauer, Stirner, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche all champion.

Few any longer question the so-called "scientific view of the world" that once gave fright to kings and popes. Its appeal rests on the claim to have abandoned the vagaries of abstract thinking and to have reestablished science anew on a wholly non-theoretical base, relying exclusively on the brute facts of nature and society as should be obvious to a healthy mind that has given up trying merely to "think" the world and has instead wholly immersed itself in it. Condemning speculative metaphysics as a fraudulent appeal to indemonstrable figments, it promotes in its place a comprehensive, realist, de-mystified, "metaphysics-free" account of man, nature and history which resolves not to stray from the finite, concrete, immediate and factual human world; an account which,

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4 Marx and Nietzsche both independently employ this phrase, though their accounts of the old history ending and the new beginning are the exact inverse of one another. The point is elaborated in my "The Revolutionary Origins of Contemporary Philosophy"; *Dionysius*, ix (1985), 129-171.
since "positive" and not theoretical, is immune to all theoretical doubts and distortions.

It is just this anti-intellectual bias, however, which renders scientism un-scientific in practice. For its appeal to evidence is at bottom dogmatic: some "general fact" is postulated and then ordinary facts conscripted in "confirmation" - thus that the progressive evolution of species is the brute fact of nature is demonstrated by the existence of certain frogs, or the actual policies of Napoleon are evinced as "proof" of the class struggle as the brute fact of history. But such a verification is wholly circular and the notion that there are primordial general facts is in any case clearly a fiction whose real function is to substitute for the appeal to reasoned principle. As the theory of evolution, physicalism, mechanistic psychology, historicism and other such doctrines demonstrate, what scientism actually produces are crypto-metaphysical doctrines which deal in postulates no less figmentary than those they mean to replace. In short, scientific positivism is just metaphysics again in another form, a metaphysics of the finite or factual world posited as absolute, that is, as "unconditionally given".

Though with similar roots and intent, absolutism stands utterly opposed to scientific positivism; the two wage continuous war throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. "The Absolute" in its ultra-modern meaning embodies a distinctly contra-speculative reference, a radical affirmation of the finite-as-absolute similar to scientism's, though now from the side of the absolute. Typically characterised as what exists in itself before all consciousness of it, thus in principle opaque and impenetrable to reason, it is only the Absolute's own self-disclosure which make its apprehension even possible, an apprehension that is for this reason pre-rational or aesthetic. Schopenhauer's Will and the Kierkegaardian inwardness provide early examples of this absolutist reference which appears in other guises throughout the century: "the Unknowable", "the Incomprehensible", "Will to Power" and so forth. nineteenth century absolutism generated a whole legacy of popular imagery - "ultimate reality" as Life, Self, Cosmos, Energy, the Unconscious etc. - while the literary tradition was also much given over to

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5 The key to "positivism" lies in the claim that objectivity and self-consciousness are not two realities but one, and that this is revealed in the simple intuition of fact. The proof is said to be directly witnessed in the "absolute fact" of self-feeling, the immediate givenness of oneself to oneself. Comte makes self-feeling, as opposed to the dualistic theoretical and practical perspectives, the basis of an identification of the objective with the phenomenal, and Mill and Russell likewise cite "feeling" as the final test of the certainty of fact, in ordinary parlance, the criterion of "obviousness".

6 Hegel, on the other hand, (Enc. 249. Zus.) makes the provocative suggestion that both evolution and emanation (the fundamentalist "creationism") are metaphysical schematizations of nature which begin at one extreme (proto-biological or ultra-biological) and deduce the whole of the order of species from it as an abstract series; neither of which really grasp the dynamic of the totality nature as one that is objectively concrete

7 The absolute is no less Anglo-American than it is European - cf. Spencer, Bradley, Whitehead or Royce. It has its political expression in nineteenth century imperialism with its reverence for Queen or Kaiser as an "absolute individual", Der Allerhochster.
the same romantic-absolutist language of inscrutables and ineffables.\textsuperscript{8} What Heidegger, playing Parmenides to ultra-modernist Milesians, later will simply call \textit{Sein}, springs from the same ancestry.

There thus exists from the beginnings of counter-philosophy a profound revolutionary-reactionary division that stems from a fundamental ambiguity as to how the \textit{reality} of a wholly finite, natural-historical human existence might be comprehended and affirmed over against the \textit{ideality} of the world as it is for traditional philosophical thought. At this point the goal is not conceived as one of bringing thinking itself to an end but rather as discovering a distinctly counter-conceptual mode of thinking: thus "science" (in this corrupted sense) or "subjectivity". For in its innermost soul the intent of the ultra-modernist spirit is not to repudiate modernity, but only to overcome what is still mediated in it, to affirm its core principle of a concrete human freedom in the world as an actually or virtually realized condition. And this is precisely its ambiguity: it would go beyond modernity and its tradition and not go beyond it; it would extend it to its most extreme form and yet withdraw from that. Accordingly, both scientific positivism or absolutist nihilism would affirm a finite reason in place of a universal and deny the idea of freedom for the sake of an actual one conceived in social terms or as a self-affirmative life. A most intense debate develops as to precisely how the "overthrow of idealism" is to be appropriated effected and what a new, ultra-modern thinking-in-the-world would be; whether the revolutionary repudiation of thought altogether or its reactionary reconstitution in a self-negative form; whether simply to step beyond reason or turn it against itself.\textsuperscript{9}

This intense controversy within counter-philosophy embodies the paradox intrinsic in the ultra-modern ideal of a purely finite reason and freedom and the corresponding overthrow of the philosophical spirit from this radical human standpoint. The counter-philosophers could only solve the dilemma by sundering the classical modern idea of freedom, the unity of reason and being, into its constitutive elements, and playing these off against one another such that what one specifies as the epitome of the metaphysical and abstract the other advances as the essence of the this-worldly and concrete. Thus positivism and its variants abrogate universal being in the name of the world as it is for a finite human reason, while absolutism abrogates universal reason in the name of being as it is for the finite existent. The one indicates as the key metaphysical superstition it would repudiate precisely that which the other affirms as the truth to be rescued from it; and \textit{vice versa}. The great debate between moralism and romanticism affords the popular paradigm: both affirmed a radical finite freedom as the unity of self-consciousness with nature. But for moralism freedom is preeminently realized in the human-practical

\textsuperscript{8} Hardy's \textit{The Dynasts} features a whole Greek chorus of "absolute spirits" declaiming about the fatality of human history. Like many of his contemporaries Yeats' weakness was for occultism and its political expression, the cult of nationalism.

\textsuperscript{9} The starkest \textit{intellectual} forms of the great revolutionary-reactionary debate were those of the nineteenth century, whose paradigms spilled over to fuel 20th century social, cultural and political tensions. The dilemma is still the subject of learned (though tamer) debates among prominent contemporary philosophers: see \textit{After Philosophy: End or Transformation?} (Cambridge, 1987).
overcoming of nature so that nothing is so morally abhorrent as the doctrine that freedom is something instinctive. But for romanticism it is just in the natural immediacy of individual self-feeling that freedom is aesthetically given, and nothing is thought to pervert this instinctive identity of freedom with "life" so much as the divorce of reason from nature which moralism promotes.\textsuperscript{10} In this manner the modern principle of the unity of reason and being would be at once subverted and conserved.

The same opposition pervades the thinking of the whole era.\textsuperscript{11} Strausss and Kierkegaard debated the revolutionary sense of the modern-Christian principle of divine-human identity, the former representing it as commitment to an objective human self-making to which subjective faith is to be given over, the latter as precisely the subjective passion of faith which leaps beyond all humanistic moralism and rationalism. Counter-metaphysics similarly divided into polar arguments of positivism and nihilism: Comte would seek a new ultra-rationalist basis for science and social morality in a being-for-man of the world to which the traditional transhuman visions of philosophy and religion are to be assimilated. But it is just the relentless in-itself-being of reality, the utter un-reason of the absolute, which for Schopenhauer annihilated everything that is merely positive or objective in human existence. What is remarkable is how the one view negatively mirrors the other and precisely and utterly abrogates just what the other asserts.

Counter-ethical thought had among its chief representatives Feuerbach and Stirner in Germany, Mill and Spencer in England and James and Royce in America. The same mutually oppositional relation of affirmation/abrogation is manifest. Feuerbach, for example, describes speculative philosophy as intellectualized Christian theology; its image of the God-man prefigures freedom as the finite individual's immediate sense of his own human species-being. The setting aside of the alienated spiritual-intellectual form in which religion and philosophy represent this relation is a political emancipation (Feuerbach: "politics is our religion")\textsuperscript{12} in which a subjective, un-humanized individuality is awakened to the consciousness of its essential humanity. To Stirner, nothing could be more alien than the notion of an objective human essence. The belonging-to-self of individuality is an ethical absolute and everything stands in relation to it as "its own". All objective ethical "causes" dissolve in the infinite reciprocity of Der Einsige und sein Eigenheit, of singularity and ownership,\textsuperscript{13} and the "spirit", whether of liberalism, humanism or moralism, is only the moribund after-life of a religious-philosophical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} That the notion of an actual freedom underlies the romantic identity of self and reality in self-feeling is exemplified in Nietzsche's definition of will to power as the "instinct to freedom", which he everywhere opposes to the unreality of a merely moral freedom
\item \textsuperscript{11} A more extended account in Jackson, F.L., "The New Faith: Strauss, Kierkegaard and the Theological Revolution" (Dionysius, xii, 1988) and "The Beginning of the End of Metaphysics" (Dionysius, xv, 1991).
\item \textsuperscript{12} The thesis of his Principles of Philosophy. Feuerbach also describes as his first principle "not the substance of Spinoza...the ego of Kant...the absolute spirit of Hegel, but the true ens realissimum - man." (Essence of Christianity, tr. Eliot p.xxxv).
\item \textsuperscript{13} Stirner, M. The Ego and His Own tr. Byington, (Sun City 1982).
\end{itemize}
unfreedom - a "spook".

These are the same positions Marx and Nietzsche later refined into doctrines that became enormously consequential for later ultra-modern thought, culture and political life. Both were aware of the limits of earlier counter-philosophical arguments which, continuing to play on the same field they would abandon, were in the end self-defeating. Marx, recognizing Feuerbach as mentor, complained that his overthrow of theology was still theological,\(^{14}\) while Nietzsche, acknowledging Schopenhauer as teacher, faulted him for refuting morality only to advance a more decadent form of the same.\(^{15}\) The trouble with the arguments of their predecessors, both concluded, was their one-sided dismissal of counter-positions had taken insufficient account of the force of those positions, a defect Marx and Nietzsche would remedy by seeking more definitely to identify their own specific counter-thesis and negatively to comprehend it within their argument. Nietzsche's work is wholly addressed to morality, the humanistic will-not-to-will as the antithesis of will-to-power; he questions how it could even arise in the first place - "how the saint is possible" - and how it has come to contaminate the whole of historical culture. Marx on the contrary would account for radical individualism and its anti-humanist ethic, which he saw as thwarting man's natural species-life; he offered a logic of ideological power and class dialectic to explain what he saw as the cruel anomaly of the rise of bourgeois societies founded on a spurious subjective freedom. Thus humanism becomes decadent individualism and individualism alienated humanism.

The appeal to totalistic, ideologically inspired theories of human history to justify some one-sided repudiation of western philosophical culture as a whole began in earnest with Marx and Nietzsche and established violent prejudices which provided the fuel, first for the class struggle and then the 20th century wars. For Marx, the revolutionary humanist, the engine that impels history is the contradiction embodied in autocratic individualism; for Nietzsche, the aesthetic autocrat, it is the apotheosis of the life-denying, humanistic spirit. What again is remarkable is the mutually contradictory character of these accounts; how they explicitly cite one another as opposites. But of course the same human history cannot be both the tale of how objective social freedom was ever frustrated by the oppressive power of the absolute individual will, and also the progressive perversion of authentic subjective life at the hands of a repressive political-technological idealism.

It is clear that the polar-opposite Marxist-Nietzschean accounts of the past are pure concoctions whose real purpose is to substantiate arguments which of their nature shun all appeal to rational grounds. It is history that becomes the medium in which the contrariety between positivist and absolutist accounts of freedom is sustained, and in such a manner that each side declares itself to be the liberation from its own counter-thesis, construed as having dominated the human past up to now. What is called history becomes the chronicle of the progress of a spirit each would now overthrow: for Nietzsche the

\(^{14}\) Marx: *Theses on Feuerbach*, I.

\(^{15}\) For example, *Beyond Good and Evil*, ss. 47, 56
apotheosis of the nihilistic human will against which the new philosopher would now
dare reaffirm "Life"; for Marx an epic of ideological oppression on the part of the ruling
classes, now at last overthrown. Both the specific account of present cultural crisis and
the specific caricature of the past from which it is alleged to spring, belong together as
reciprocal facets of one argument, whose interest is not really in world history but in
reconstructing it to generate counterfoils to what are essentially ultra-modernist positions.
It is inevitable that history itself, especially the history of philosophy, is barbarized in the
process, and the legacy of this barbarization is everywhere still evident and has indeed
become the accepted view of the past.

What scientism's atheistic, a-logistic positivism would defend is objective progress
toward a fully actual human world, a condition of finite and tangible freedom such as
traditional spirituality is said to have written off as impossible and unworthy. Absolutism
would similarly affirm a radically finite freedom, the freedom of authentically subjective
individual life whose repression is alleged to have constituted the burden and theme of
traditional culture. These ultra-modernist forms of extreme humanism and extreme
individualism appear to themselves as if pitted against a common enemy, the tradition of
reason and its "idealism", but in reality they are pitted against each other and with am
intensity which, when translated into political action, was to become fanatical.

The response of the philosophical tradition to nineteenth century ultra-modernism was
to attempt to erect bulwarks; the later part of the century sees a rash of "neo-idealisms" -
neo-Platonism, neo-Thomism, neo-Kantism etc. - which were not true reversions to these
earlier positions but exploited them to fashion anti-anti-idealist weapons with which to go
to war with materialism. But doing battle on fields and with arms chosen by the enemy,
they succeeded only in further distorting the very sources they would invoke - Plato
became a Victorian moralist, Hegel a Prussian nationalist or British imperialist. In the
subsequent stand-off between ultra-modernism and neo-idealism it became clear to the
former that its fuller conquest of the tradition of reason required that the attack be taken
into the precincts of philosophy itself, there to repudiate it on its own turf. Accordingly,
20th century critical thought is more than merely counter-philosophical; it carries out its
subversion of reason from a standpoint that claims to be at once beyond philosophy and
itself philosophical: meta-philosophy.\(^\text{16}\)

\section*{II. Meta-Philosophy: the 20th Century Schools}

\(^{16}\) "Meta-philosophy" in its ultra-modern sense is ambiguous, since the "beyond" it refers to is not the
"meta-" of traditional "meta-physics", thinking that goes beyond the finite, but the reverse. Meta-
philosophy's "beyond" would leave the thought-world behind for a here-and-now defined in specifically
counter-metaphysical terms of language, temporality, the fact-world, \textit{Dasein} etc. Its appropriate image is
Nietzsche's Zarathustra who climbs \textit{down} the mountain into wisdom. The "going-beyond" is thus really
"meta-meta-physical": a drawing-back from first-order contexts of thinking (ethics, logic, ontology) into a
second-order counter-thinking: (meta-ethic, meta-logic, meta-ontology).
The general standpoint and presumption of 20th century thought is of self-consciously free, contemporary individuals existing in immediate relation to a finite world they directly know as their own. All notions of reality beyond this world are ruled false or "metaphysical". Scientism and absolutism have so far become second nature that the thought-world appears to have entirely receded into the past: a "traditional philosophy" that can be no longer relevant for a confident individuality that has become wholly attached to what is distinctly and concretely there and possible for finite human practice and life. Schools of analytical and existential philosophy arose to articulate this position. They would aggressively seek to occupy the intellectual territory on the hither side of an epochal break with the old world of reason, taken as a *fait accompli*, and would rise to the adequate thought of a brave new world of subjective freedom which is sustained through the definitive critique of the standpoint of traditional philosophy: definitive since itself philosophical. Philosophy is to carry out its own refutation.

From this standpoint the whole of traditional thought is taken as vitiated through its habit of transcending limits now declared insuperable. It has been guilty of ignoring the perspectival limits of consciousness, for example, of thinking beyond time, of "forgetting" the radical finiteness of being, of uncritically accepting non-factual statements as true, of failing to realize "thinking" is only linguistic activity and so on - to all of which offenses traditional philosophy itself would of course readily confess. The new philosophy on the contrary will make no claim to any first-order knowledge; it will constitute itself solely as the second-order reflection whose only aim is to legislate against such transgressions and to get investigations under way designed to expose, arrest, curb and correct the perennial pretensions of rational thought in its misguided aspiration to an impossible universal knowledge.

As logic and ontology are foundational in philosophy, the new meta-philosophy initially took shape as attempts to establish a new logic and ontology of the finite to supersede their traditional foundation in thinking reason. Accordingly, a number of nineteenth century experiments in mathematics and psychology paved the way for later reconstructions of logic along essentially extra-logical lines: Brentano, Boole, Frege, Peirce and others. The inward motivation of this revolution was not at all to advance logical science itself but to bring logic as a whole under what are essential *ultra*-logical criteria, drawn from mathematics, semiotics or psychology. The analytical and phenomenological schools trace their roots to such meta-logical and meta-ontological "investigations" of the first decades of the 20th century: Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, *Principia Mathematica*, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, *Being and Time*.

The aim of the new methods was completely to undermine the traditional philosophy through methodical "clarifications" of all its alleged obfuscations and fallacies. That such a meta-analysis of philosophy is the only legitimate task of philosophy itself was to become the conventional wisdom by mid-century. Ironically, "philosophy" appeared suddenly reborn; for several generations the works of the grand masters of meta-philosophy - Frege, Dewey, Russell, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Heidegger - became virtually scriptural, the required class-texts of vast academic schools whose scholars produced mountains of research aimed at completing the final critique of traditional philosophy.
The whole legacy from Plato and Kant was read and taught again on a mass level, not on its own terms, but so as to provide grist for the meta-philosophical mill to grind into fine critical dust, or as a source of interesting themes to be suitably transposed into the new key. Meta-logic and meta-ontology came to dominate academic philosophy through the century; it precisely expresses the spirit of the ultra-modernist heyday, the era of final solutions, whose art, popular culture and philosophy, no less than its politics, affirmed as absolute the finite will to overthrow all absolutes.

The claim of the new analysis to put philosophy on the side of science did not mean philosophy was itself to become science but that since knowledge is assumed exclusively to be the positive-scientific account of the fact-world, the true role of philosophy must be to establish and defend the rules of such scientific verification meta-scientifically. Though Russell's logical atomism looks much like a rehash of classical British empiricism (for simple and complex ideas read atomic or molecular facts; for laws of induction read truth-functions etc.) the difference is that for Russell there no longer are any empirical things-in-themselves; no ideas, no thinking subjects, no reasoned empirical inferences, in short, no philosophical knowledge. There is only the positive "fact-world" and individuals who use language to mirror it. Logic is not thought reflecting on its own inward structure - there are no "thinking beings", only brain-equipped linguistic animals. Logic is meta-logic, the second-order system of rules, themselves wholly factual, for the correct formulation of positive statements. The realm of propositionally pictured fact is for Russell the only real world there is, the radically finite here-and-now world which analytical philosophy would oppose to the thought-world of traditional metaphysics.

The commencement is thus decidedly not with any appeal to a rational basis but to a series of dogmas which simply declare how things stand with finite individuals fashioning statements about their equally finite world. Among these dogmas: only the fact-world exists and nothing else does; to "know" is correctly to state facts through propositions; only propositions referring to empirical facts are true or false, all others merely formal or empty expressions; empirical science alone judges as to what the facts are and metaphysical or ethical statements are nonsense; the exclusive business of logic (hence philosophy) is so to clarify the rules of propositional statement that all non-factual claims can finally be put to rest. These same positions are repeated in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which more decisively makes it the sole business of philosophy, not to frame propositions of its own, but only "to make propositions clear". The work makes a beginning toward ridding the Russellian formulae of their crypto-metaphysical residue, establishing more strictly the rule that of what would lie beyond the facts and their verbal picturing "nothing can be said" and so we should remain silent.

Later positivists develop the same emphasis in attempts to formulate a "principle of verification" through whose relentless application every temptation to metaphysical

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17 Russell's *The Scientific Outlook* (1931) and Ayer's *Language Truth and Logic* (1936, c.2.) are typical manifestos of this fundamental collusion of analysis with empirical science.
judgement might be arrested. Through a generation of analytical literature, however, the limits of the verification criterion worked their way to the fore: it is impotent respecting scientific generalities like \( E=MC^2 \); it cannot explained why only physics-like statements are factual without invoking empiricist metaphysics; the ghost of an ultra-factual "world-out-there" always seems presupposed; its restriction of meaningfulness to factual utterance in any case stretches credulity. Moreover, its essential dogmatism is exposed in that its criterion cannot apply to itself without self-destructing. It becomes apparent that the regime that allows only factual statements to be meaningful is itself wholly metaphysical and does not square with the intent of the new philosophy which was to establish a meta-metaphysical beach-head in the everyday world in such way as to demystify it of all metaphysical prejudices. The need is felt for a less theory-laded approach to analytical investigation such as would comprehend a multitude of meaningful ways in which individuals use language to address and express their immediate world.

The later Wittgenstein will thus speak of propositional logic as only one use of language which it is presumptious to rank above others. His analysis asks that we avoid assumptions as to what may or may not be meaningful or true and which privileges some particular use of language, a step which can only be justified extra-linguistically, that is metaphysically. The more adequate inoculation against metaphysics is the recognition that the problems of traditional philosophy are really linguistic neuroses and bottlenecks and true philosophy the analytical therapy which liberates language from these fixations and shows "the fly the way out of the fly-bottle". Such analysis will avoid explicit counter-metaphysical refutations like that of logical positivism; it will simply unravel the linguistic tangles that constitute the knotty problems and puzzles, including positivist ones, that engender what has been called "philosophy". The standard of normality for this therapy is the everyday, spontaneous use of language as the "common behaviour of mankind". It is no longer a question of uncovering hidden realities or even of comprehending or changing obvious ones; the simple task of a linguistic philosophy is to bear witness to ordinary language-behaviour and thus to "leave everything as it is". Thus would Wittgenstein affirm the preeminence of the immediate, quotidian world of everyday talk over the alleged tortured perspectives of reason. It is no longer a question of a pre-given fact-world pictured in static empirical propositions, but of a contextual, behavioural world of common linguistic usage, seen as absolute since nothing whatever can be uttered or understood except in its terms.

Wittgenstein's linguistic positivism sent everyone into the cultural byways looking, "not for the meaning, but the use". With Austin the everyday dictionary and thesaurus were elevated to the rank of philosophical texts. The rule was to treat all instances of linguistic behaviour as differing "language-games", each with its peculiar rules, each

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18 Given the ultra-rational stand of Carnap and others it would have been more proper to speak of a verification criterion rather than arché; a "criterion" is a dogmatic device, a "principle" implies a reason.

19 Wittgenstein's specific views on philosophy are found in *Philosophical Investigations*, ss. 89-133.

20 *Philosophical Investigations*, s.206.
appropriate to its context, and none, not even empirical propositions, affording privileged access to extra-linguistic truth. It was now even possible to turn again to religious "god-talk" or ethical or metaphysical pronouncements so long as the same non-committal interest was maintained as would apply to the analysis of the rules of the lingo that builders use on the job; that is, without making any commitment whatever to what the language of theology, ethics or science actually said. This studied reduction of every content to the form of the language used to communicate it became one of the most powerful paradigms of all 20th century academic teaching and research. In philosophy it was thought a great liberation to be released from grappling with first-order problems which one could now feel satisfied were in any case bogus and easily resolved simply by reference to the ordinary language one ordinarily spoke and in which one could presume to be already somewhat expert. Philosophy of language provided a solid, readily available and democratic vantage-point from which almost anyone could effect the summary overthrow of philosophy and be instantly emancipated from all the illusions, as well as the hard labour, of rational thought.

Husserl makes essentially the same commencement as Russell with researches into mathematical foundations. His is also a revolt against traditional metaphysics and "unscientific" ways of thinking. He too appeals to the immediate, temporal life-world as it is for existing individuals, with stress on the subjective aspect of its givenness. His understanding of the role of a new logic and ontology is the mirror-complement of Russell's: what is important is not the fact but the facticity of the fact, not the fact-world as objective but as a system of meaning. Scientific philosophy will be the eidetic analysis of the modes of the "being-there" of the world for the "consciousness-of" it, to which access is gained by suspension of every thesis and inference that would go beyond the "things themselves" in their primordial givenness. This *epoché* sets all appeal to metaphysics, including empiricist metaphysics, in abeyance; in one para-Cartesian stroke the world for thinking reason is summarily suspended and all that remains is phenomenologically to describe the pre-reflexive being-for-consciousness-of-the-world which is thereby revealed.

Heidegger's inspiration for *Sein und Zeit* was the same intentional relation of existential consciousness to its own pre-reflexive world. *Dasein*, as "the being for whom being itself is a question", is quite the same "I" as Husserl's phenomenological subject

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21 Though he thinks of it very differently; see for example *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague, 1960) ss. 3-7, where scientific evidence is spoken of, not in Russellian terms of factuality, but in terms of "apodeictic certainty" or "givenness". "The evidence for the factual existence of the world [is] not apodeictic" and is thus to be included in the "Cartesian overthrow" (p.17). Husserl's narrow ties are with nineteenth century psychologism (Brentano) and historicism (Dilthey). Like Russell he betrays a notorious naivety respecting the actual history of philosophy, blaming Hegelian metaphysics, for example, for the degeneration of the idea of a "philosophical science" - a charge that would mystify Hegel who speaks of little else. But it is not really naivety that renders meta-philosophical accounts of the tradition characteristically cavalier and skewed but the deliberate intent negatively to reconstruct it to suit the ultra-modernist thesis. This is evidenced by the simple fact that the manner in which phenomenology and analytical philosophy understood the history of metaphysics are not just different; they are mirror images of one another.
though analyzed rather in ontological terms of the modes of this finite-being (being-in-the-world, fallen-ness, being-with, Angst) as also the modes in which being stands related to it (available, useful, present or absent, disclosed, concealed). Time is revealed as the essence of being; it is in its various ecstatic modes that being presents and absents itself. Thus would Heidegger express how things stand for the finite individual who affirms a radically temporal, conditional and contingent world as his own. A whole mid-century culture of popular existentialism took its cue from this kind of reflection and developed it in all sorts of directions, particularly in the arts.

But like Wittgenstein, and for analogous reasons, the later Heidegger drew away from the quasi-psychological approach of phenomenology into a more direct ontological format. For if access to being is sought through analysis of the special case of Dasein, as Sein u. Zeit proposed, it must remain problematical whether what is disclosed thereby applies only to the special case, or to being itself; whether temporality, for example, is a dimension peculiar to human being only or to Being as such and on the whole. Playing Spinoza to Husserl's Descartes, Heidegger gave himself wholly over to the "question of being" as such and to the thinking that might think it in this negative-ontological sense. His later essays are thus occupied with giving an account of being qua being in the classical Thomistic-Aristotelian manner, except that instead of the eternal, unitary, universal categories of being in the traditional account, it now discloses itself through radically contrary, this-worldly categories of particularity, temporality, fatality, difference, contingency, eventuality, fortuity and so on. In short, Heidegger's is an inverse metaphysics, a meta-metaphysics of the finite, which is to say a doctrine of being as time.

In so seeking an account of being as it would be for a wholly finite subject and renouncing the conceptual thinking that would "transgress" this limit, Heidegger resorts to more and more recondite neologisms, questionable etymology and unhistorical histories, couched in a counter-conceptual, quasi-theological and poetizing language that speaks in earthy woodland metaphors of paths, turnings, inns, clearings, backtracking, harkening and so forth, just as Nietzsche liked to speak of mountains and clear air. The result is an arcane language that the most practised academics learn to speak only with difficulty with ceaseless debate over lexical nuances even then. This abstruseness is not just a weakness, however, but deliberate on the part of the author who explicitly pronounces conceptual language to be inappropriate to the standpoint of the finite

22 Phenomenology had indeed a strong impact on 20th century psychology. Not only had Sartre, Jaspers and many others written extensively on psychological subjects, but "phenomenological psychology", owing much to Merleau-Ponty's seminal work, The Phenomenology of Perception, became for a time in universities everywhere the chief rival to the Skinnerian behaviourism which tended to be the model championed in analytical circles.

23 A Heideggerian account of Heidegger's "turn" is found in Nicholson, G., Illustrations of Being (Toronto 1992), c.4.4.

24 A clear forerunner of Heideggerian being is "the world as will" as Schopenhauer described it: the wholly inscrutable manifestation of an absolute being-in-self that is directly the annihilation of what is so manifest.
subjectivity he would establish and articulate. As what he means to say is thus intentionally and in itself contrary to thought and cannot in principle be articulated in any clear way, it can be grasped only aesthetically, or better, subjective-existentially, which is of course the whole point.

The aim of the 20th century schools was to avoid the paradox entailed in direct confrontations with philosophical reason by developing meta-philosophical disciplines that could claim to be independent of it while setting its limits and effecting its decisive critique - and doing so philosophically. It would be a thinking-beyond-thinking, a radical thinking; "ultra-philosophy" in the proper sense of the term. In an inverted replay of the stoic and epicurean dogmatisms which sought a philosophical freedom in but not of the world, the meta-philosophers of Language and Existence promised disengagement from the thought-world of traditional morality and metaphysics and triumphant return to the human here-and-now world of positive fact and authentic existence. This they would accomplish through new ways of thinking that dissociate themselves from the philosophical legacy while remaining critically engaged with it. Linguistic analysis allows weighty issues of philosophy to continue to be addressed, while at the same time assuring a complete and utter detachment from them. So also existential ontology, which represents being as what is forever concealed in every attempt to comprehend it in thought, but which declares itself nonetheless in poetic intuitions which not only supersede thinking but claim to be thinking itself at its deepest and most penetrating.

The more these ultra-philosophical programmes came to dominate 20th century inquiry the more professionalised and esoteric they became. From the original revolutionary enthusiasm of a decisive redirecting of thought to the human world and an absolute individual freedom within it, philosophy withdrew into a nether-world of industrious paper-work, of interminable critique-ing of critiques and circular interpretation of interpretation addressed to the so-called "literature", that is, chiefly to its own journalistic productions. Drawn into this purely intellectual process, the ordinary issues and ideas that might spontaneously occur to a genuinely philosophical spirit are institutionalized and dissipated in highly specialized forms of argumentation. What passed for the teaching of philosophy became largely a matter of the inculcation of the orthodox watchwords, formulae and conventions required of any who might elect to participate in the esoteric business of academic seminars and research, so that the meta-philosophical schools tended finally to degenerate into a kind of scholasticism.

The reason for this lies in the way the ambivalence of the ultra-modernist project recurs in the case of meta-philosophy. Its very idea depends on assuming a double-tiered

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25 Captivated by the Platonic vision of an oasis of reasonable life removed from the shifting sands of world-bound opinion, stoicism and epicureanism were able to attain to such only in the limited form of an inward, detached self-consciousness to which an ineradicable outwardness and arbitrariness still clung. (See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy {New York, 1974}, v.2 sect.2.) Ultra-modern dogmatism takes a reverse course. Its vision is a modern-Christian one of a divine-human reconciliation whereby a free, rational, human spirit has reengaged the world to redeem it. But though it is just this concrete spirit that ultra-modernism would get hold of it only does so in a partial and one-sided way, such as loses hold of the universal aspect of reason and freedom and sinks itself entirely into their finite and existential expressions.
thinking: a division between a first-order, uncritical thinking that in the case of philosophy spawns illusory knowledge, and a second-order thinking which knows nothing itself but is purely critical. Everything depends on keeping these two strictly separated: second-order critique must not be confused with a first-order knowledge - the axioms of logic are not facts, the *epoché* is not a psychological event, linguistic analysis is not a Cambridge language-game. And likewise, the basis of first-order knowledge must not be the product of second-order reflection but be given independently - facts are just there, language is ordinary behaviour, the encounter with being is prereflexive. Yet the nature and limit of first-order knowledge is precisely what second-order critique claims the right to dictate, though it can never say where it gets its criterion for so doing. If it simply asserts it, that is arbitrary; if it appeals to some theoretical justification it become itself a first-order knowledge; if it applies the same criterion to itself - as if linguistic analysis were itself a language-game, or Heideggerean being another way being is present - then it becomes reflexively circular.²⁶

The fate of meta-philosophy is thus that the need to hold these two sides apart keeps foundering on their incipient reciprocity and *vice versa*. The objective of a final and decisive meta-philosophical critique fades as argument and meta-argument pass inexorably over into one another and as critique inevitably becomes theory and theory evokes the need of new critique. This inevitable collapse into a vortex of mutual contradiction may appear to be somewhat arrested by stop-gap measures, such as Gadamer's hermeneutical circle which would artificially hold the moments of this reflexivity apart and set them into an endless series. But as Kant pointed out, a series with no beginning or end has no decidable interim locus either, so that in truth no interpretation of an interpretation can be significant and is in fact meaningless precisely so far as circular. Reflexivity is thus the reef upon which the whole meta-philosophical ideal is bound to founder.²⁷

### III. Post-Philosophy: the Sceptical Result

Post-modernism springs from recognition of the insufficiency of earlier, dogmatic forms of ultra-modernism. Though frequently presented as a new and original view, it does not really take thinking in any new directions but continues the directions of ultra-modern thought a further stage. It sees that liberation is not achieved through meta-

²⁶ Logical positivism was never able successfully to come to grips with paradoxes of self-reference, to formalize the reference of propositions to what they denote, or to avoid an empiricist metaphysics without lapsing into solipsism. Likewise, in insisting that thinking is just language, later analysis could sustain itself as philosophy only by turning into a metaphysics of words. Again, the ontological reflection that would repudiate any universal account of things by dint of the sheer finitude of existence, is forced to exempt its own account from the same ban or else risk collapse into a banal absurdism. And the argument in its later form could never complete its turn to a stable thought of being as time, since this would contradict what being is said to be, namely temporal, self-differential.

²⁷ An example of the emerging consciousness of this fact in Hilary Lawson, *Reflexivity, the Post-Modern Predicament* (LaSalle 1985).
arguments that, in seeking to limit the standpoint of philosophical reason, only tacitly recognize it, thereby reinstating the same issues and conundrums of traditional thought in another form. Post-philosophy will go further to affirm the bankruptcy of all principle-centred thought as such, "logocentrism", whether traditional, counter-traditional or meta-traditional. It will no longer even pretend to bring philosophy to an end (though it may abandon it) for that is to assume there is such a thing and that it somewhat makes sense to end it; and this is just what must be denied. To aspire to a final solution in philosophy, even one that would eradicate it altogether, is in any case only to establish some further regime in its place.

By sceptically suspending, not only first-order thought, but also the search for immaculate second-order critical conceptions, post-philosophy would seem to realize the essential aims of an ultra-modern overthrow without falling into the trap of simply reinstating philosophy again on the other side of the critical boundary-line. For even a negative ontology is still about being, symbolic logic still has rules and axioms, a strict science is envisaged beyond the epoché, and some semiotic theory or other is inevitably invoked in defense of the appeal to a pre-theoretical standard of words. If both counter-and meta-philosophical critiques only resurrect philosophy again, then how might the ultra-modernist project be refashioned such as successfully to accomplish its aim of a radical overthrow of the traditional thinking spirit of philosophy?

The post-modern answer is that we ought to resolve to rid ourselves from the very outset of the "prejudice" that there are such things as philosophical positions and arguments and that they make any sense; a prejudice which leads to another, namely that it is up to us to expose them as false by carrying out their decisive critique and declaring an end to philosophy. The new scepticism will suspend all such assumptions outright; it will not seek to promote any new first-order insights but neither will it advance any new critical methodology, for that too becomes irrelevant once the illusion that there are philosophical positions, correct arguments, true judgements and so on have all been put to rest. Its sole object will be to point out how all discourses of the kind which pretend to a privileged viewpoint from which to execute true judgements of universal accounts of the world are spurious; and not spurious from the point of view of some alternative, more "correct" account, but spurious in themselves. It follows that all attempts to carry out a critique of such accounts participate in that discourse and so are equally to be judged spurious.

Post-modern thought thus represents the sceptical turn which no longer seeks either the dogmatic or critical repudiation of philosophy because it has come to the view that all argument for or against rational foundations are in themselves pointless. If it remains "philosophy" at all it is only as post-philosophy, the reflection which seeks no more than to convince the philosophical legacy of its own self-defeated irrelevance. This it might do in a number of ways: by juxtaposing or recontextualizing fragments of texts drawn from the literature to expose the alleged self-conflictual nature of philosophical arguments - that they flout their own rules, contravene the very axioms they disavow and even
conflict with the philosopher's personal character. Or, it might redefine philosophy as nothing more than a type of cultural narrative, specifically "meta-narrative", and then argue on grounds of the relativity of culture the illegitimacy of that genre. Or it might commence with the pragmatic requirements of the extant democratic societies showing how their interests and advancement must take precedence over philosophical rumination which, if it might have once had a value, now only deflects and confuses the commitment of progressive individuals to the open society.

Though post-philosophy takes many forms the common theme is sceptical in the broadest sense. For the perspective for which the futility of all reasoned argument has become axiomatic, after all, there can be no longer be talk of positions or critical refutations thereof. Adopting no position, philosophical or meta-philosophical, the post-philosopher occupies a "non-locus" on the boundary between philosophy and its negation, from which vantage point to interrogate positions and counter-positions in such a way as will simply allow their self-refuting tendency to do its own work. Thus Derrida:

I keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse ...for I do not believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy... I have attempted to find...a non-site, a non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy. [This] search for a non-philosophical site does not bespeak an anti-philosophical attitude. My central question is: how can philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner.

Rorty uses a similar language; he speaks of a rhetoric, "strong poetry" or small-philosophy whose specific business will be to take large-P Philosophy to task, to force it to give up on itself. Such a thinking which withdraws from itself to interrogate or renounce itself has already abandoned the option of taking a stand within or outside

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28 This appeal ad hominem was one of Nietzsche's favourite tactics: consider his diatribe against Strauss, his essay Contra Wagner, the vitriolic attack on Aquinas in Geneology of Morals, or the chapter of Beyond Good and Evil titled "On the Prejudices of Philosophers". A recent post-modern example is Derrida's Glas (U.Nebraska, 1986) in which Hegel's relations with his sister and others are made to appear perversely at odds with his philosophy of the family. Such attacks are of course not "personal" in the strict sense but they reflect a basic ultra-modernist prejudice which refuses to accept that "thought" can have any other meaning beyond the thought of some particular, finite individual. 

29 What Hegel called "objective spirit" becomes in its ultra-modernist reformulation by Marxists, English liberals and American pragmatists the apotheosis of the practical which assimilates all other dimensions of freedom to itself. With Richard Rorty it assumes a post-modern form which no longer speaks of a "free society" as a desired end-state or achieved revolution as with earlier liberals or socialists, but only the contingent commitment of individuals to an undefined social openness.

30 Derrida, Positions (Chicago 1981), p.6

31 In an interview with R. Kearney in Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, (Manchester UP, 1984) p.98.
philosophy. It stands aloof to the tendency within philosophy to surmount oppositions, reduce differences to unity and give itself a transcendental content; but it equally disdains to stand outside philosophy passing judgement on this tendency from some other position (science, meta-logic, praxis, poetry or whatever). In the interest of a more complete undermining of thought it lets ambiguities stand, embraces the metaphoric, undecidable character of meaning, and pursues "philosophy" only as the means to an ironic suspension that sets every philosophical issue whatever, including all resolutions thereof, in abeyance.

This of course is the classical form of all scepticism. In lieu of categories, axioms or methods its appeal is to tropes, rhetorical devices whose function is not to prove or disprove anything but to effect the epoché which sustains detachment from all reasons and arguments. Derrida's trope is "différance", described as neither concept nor technique but the dynamic that predetermines all meaning as differential/deferential rather than identical/referential. It is advanced as "the common root of the oppositional concepts, sensible-intelligible, intuition-signification, nature-culture" (also word-idea, being-thought, ontic-ontological, writing-speaking etc.). The "logocentric" thinking of philosophy prejudices one term in a dichotomy and represses the other so as to bring it to "presence" and to link it to some fictional "transcendental signified" seen as the object of a fictional intuition of thought - "idea", "being" etc. - which is thereby made immune to ambiguity or controversy. To reverse this metaphysical tendency, as critiques of metaphysics do, simply by affirming the opposite term - matter rather than mind, say - is only logocentrism again since "every transgressive gesture, precisely by giving us a grip on the closure of metaphysics, reencloses us within this closure." To restore the priority of déférance, philosophical and meta-philosophical positions are "interrogated" to reveal how metaphoric instability still clings to and corrupts their terminology and unsettles the attempted fixations of meaning by which they would sublate ambiguity only to retain it in covert ways.33

Rorty is a "positive" sceptic in that the standpoint from which he would subvert and finally abandon philosophy springs from practical considerations, namely, what is necessary to advance the cause of "post-modern bourgeois liberalism".34 Pragmatism is of course scepticism's other face, its ethical counterpart, as in ancient times. Rorty's is not the approach of the exquisitely erudite European who knows how to make words and texts "tremble" and shatter every meaning into a maelstrom of nuances and conflicting

32 Positions, p.12.

33 Derrida's goes to great lengths to repudiate the logic of Aufhebung in an effort to represent the wish to transcend difference as what primarily moves Hegel's logical thought. This runs surprisingly contrary to how Hegel himself represents the dynamic, for example in Encyc., ss. 79-82, or how he treats difference itself in ss. 117-120 and in the Doctrine of Essence of the Science of Logic where, far from "transcending" difference, Hegel demonstrates how, in the concept of Ground, difference and identity are revealed as presupposing one another. Derrida, on the other hand would fix difference as absolute.

associations. He is the no-nonsense American pragmatist who has learned from James and Dewey how to caricature philosophical verbalisms to make them ridiculous in the eyes of common-sense individuals confident of their objective freedom. Rorty also disdains to debate philosophy on its own terms; rather he would challenge classical philosophical notions of the thinking subject or a reason mirroring nature on ideological grounds rather than in the quasi-metaphysical mode of semiotic analysis. He sees the acceptance of philosophical beliefs as inimical to the openness to practical possibilities that is essential to the advancement of "liberal society" which he describes post-philosophically in terms of actually extant, ethnic-historical collectivities, namely "the rich North Atlantic democracies" whose survival is for him all that matters.  

This Anglo-American pragmatism contrasts sharply, of course, with the anarchic sensualism of the French post-modernists; but it is evident from the esteem they hold for one another's work that it is quite the same interest that moves both a Rorty and a Derrida. For Derrida, interrogating the extant legacy of philosophical writing has the end, in the Nietzschean tradition, of an aesthetic suspension of assent to all objective accounts of existence; Rorty's rhetorical interrogation of Philosophy, on the other hand, employs irony, satire and rhetoric to loosen habitual attachments to theoretical abstractions, thereby to strengthen communal solidarity among contingently constituted individuals. The aim and effect is in general the same: the conservation of a radically concrete individual freedom through the deliberate subversion of the abstract perspectives of reason.

Common also to Derrida and Rorty is the view that meta-philosophy - the standpoint equally of Wittgenstein and Heidegger - is no longer supportable. Such methods could not complete the decisive overthrow of reason because even though claiming to occupy purely critical and thus "presuppositionless" positions they founded philosophical positions nonetheless: a counter-metaphysics of temporal as opposed to infinite being, a meta-logic of fact opposed to a logic of thought, a transcendental deduction from contingency rather than apperception, a semiotic a priori replacing an epistemological one. This could not arrest and suspend the dominion of philosophical thought but only divide it into two, a traditional and a contemporary philosophy, the western-traditional legacy and its meta-philosophical critique, the corpse and its autopsy. Oppositionally dependent on the very legacy they would overthrow, they were doomed to remain entangled in it, the older tradition persisting in the new meta-philosophical doctrines as their specifically negated content.

Post-philosophy would rather accomplish the sceptical neutralization of philosophy, not by direct refutation, but by sceptically-pragmatically construing all its positions to make them appear self-refuting, to generate their own contrariness, or to collapse, as it were, under their own weight. This tactic again shows little interest in, or respect for the

35 Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p.15

36 Derrida's positive attachments to America are well known; for reciprocity on Rorty's part see for example: "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?", in Madison, G.B., Working Through Derrida, Evanston 1993.
actual history of philosophy, for it gives no credence even to the idea that there is such. This amounts to a licence to manhandle traditional authors and texts. Rorty cites Representation as the ruling myth of philosophy and assimilates virtually the whole of the western tradition to this one idea, by which he understands the invention of fictitious faculties or media (first Thought and more recently Language) whose real purpose is to establish some static perception of things as absolute and permanent; a view anathema to liberals. Derrida rather speaks of a long-standing addiction of philosophy to the idea of Presence, similarly an invention of universal, self-given objects - "nature", "spirit", "being" - whose intent is to enable the denial of what Nietzsche calls "Life" and Derrida the inescapable ambiguity and uncertainty intrinsic to the determination of meaning.

Both belabour Descartes, Kant, Heidegger and many others by way of exemplifying these alleged self-contradictory artifices of philosophy, and this without much regard to the actual history of thought which in fact offers precious little confirmation of such a consistent record of specific delusions and indeed a great deal of plain evidence to the contrary. But for post-philosophy this it not to the point since it is neither its aim nor intent to be an objective interpretation of philosophical history, the validity of which it in any case roundly denies. Rather, as with ancient scepticism, the sweeping judgements and clever reworking of the arguments of an Aristotle or Hegel or Nietzsche in order to "demonstrate" the alleged self-inconsistency of philosophical positions are sceptical tropes whose sole purpose is to maintain a post-modern detachment from the standpoint of thinking reason, whether in its universal or its historical manifestations.

But in post-philosophy the original ultra-modernist paradox, as to how an end to thinking may be thought, is again not really resolved but only brought more vividly to light. For not only is the ambiguity of its outlook patent in the torturously obscure and deliberately indecisive rhetoric in which it is obliged to couch its thesis, but also in the self-subverting character of the task that it sets itself. For what it attempts is to abjure in principle every appeal to principle; to render the absolute indeterminacy of meaning meaningful; to deny that logic has force and then turn the logic of positions against themselves; to affirm categorically and as a global judgement that no overview is ever possible; and so on.

Were post-philosophy indeed to fall victim to the temptation to give itself a definite content (Rorty is often suspected of such for his blatantly liberal assumptions and Derrida for a tendency to relapse into semiotic theory) it would cease to be authentically post-philosophical and become just another meta-narrative - the problem to which Lyotard was sensitive. It is therefore essential to post-modern thinking it not be "about" anything.

37 To depict Descartes as a "representationalist" as Rorty does entirely affronts the actual Cartesian argument which commences precisely with the suspension of representational assumptions in order to proceed from self-conscious thought alone. Similarly, Derrida's quite silly account of Leibniz's logic or religious ambitions or his free-form Freudian speculations on Hegel's feelings for his sister are the purest flights of trivializing invention showing an almost perverse disdain both for the individuals and their arguments. But again, for post-modernists, the point is never historical arguments themselves but only how they may be exploited for the construction of their own sceptical tropes, as post-modern architects freely borrow from the styles of the past without much regard for their original spirit.
or at least not allow itself to say what it is about. The only "content" it has is to be the relentless, subversive, inconclusive reflection carried out on an extant philosophical literature which, paradoxically, it is bound to conserve in order to sustain itself through the continuous deconstruction of it.

Through its own very project, then, post-philosophy becomes a wholly intellectual activity without result, thematic substance or reference. In it the paradox implied in the attempt to think beyond thinking is no longer merely latent, as in earlier ultra-philosophy; it is this paradox itself in the active form of a self-annihilating thinking. The restrictions it would set on all reasonable argument prevent it from arguing its own case with reason, that is, intelligibly. Perched on a sceptical fence it must withdraw in one moment what it asserts in the next: it says philosophy is about the writing-reading of texts and then again that there are no texts; or philosophy is an open, deliberately inconclusive conversation and then draws the boldest, dogmatic conclusions about all and sundry. That post-modern writing is given to wilful inconsistency, to ambiguous sleights of language or has recourse to comic, anarchistic or even pornographic rhetoric, expresses the predicament that it may never allow itself to say what it means, identify a theme, or reach a conclusion, for to do that would undermine the purity of the "post-philosophical" non-thinking it would sustain.

Conclusion: The Recovery of Philosophy

In post-philosophy ultra-modernist thought reaches both an impasse and a completion. Its project radically to affirm the modern principle of a concrete, here-and-now freedom in contrast with the other-worldliness of the spiritual-speculative tradition is articulated in its most extreme form. In its purely sceptical reflection on the philosophical legacy it is itself the attempted embodiment of the paradoxical idea of a self-annihilating thinking. This is far from saying, however, that it has at last succeeded in finally overthrowing and nullifying thought so that it really is now all over for philosophy. On the contrary, post-philosophy, even more than earlier forms of ultra-philosophy, remains tied to the tradition it disavows. By its own admission it cannot think to bring about the actual end of philosophy for that would not only be to revert to an ultra-modernist dogmatism whose very difficulties it was meant to overcome, but also to eliminate the very context whose deconstruction alone is what sustains it. And so it can only remain on the sceptical margins and boundaries, a purely suspensive thinking unable either to go beyond philosophy or return to it.

If the outcome of ultra-modern thought since Hegel has indeed been the destruction of philosophy, this ought not to be understood as the direct consequence of its arguments but rather as a significant side-effect. While it is true that appreciation of the basic standpoint and argument of the great western philosophical texts has atrophied or been distorted and maligned to the point of extinction, this is not due to the success of scientism or Marxism or analysis or existential ontology or post-modernism in literally disproving, demystifying, repudiating, exposing or disposing of it. Rather it is due to the
real history of philosophy, the actual tradition of thought, having been buried and obscured under so many layers of misinterpretation and distortion visited upon it by generations of aggressive ultra-modernist dogma that it has become barely recoverable. For as earlier made out, not only is there a history of the ultra-philosophical argument as such, but also a history of its various reconstructions of the philosophical legacy, reconstructions which had little or nothing to do with that legacy itself or with understanding it on its own terms, but with enlisting it, appropriately misconstrued, in support of one or another version of the argument for a radicalized modernity. As the form of the ultra-philosophical dogma changed, so did the form of the attack on the philosophical tradition, and so also the form of the reconstruction of it.

And its point in all this was to retain a relation to philosophical history even while superseding it; to conserve itself as "philosophy" through appeal to negative reconstructions of the whole tradition of reason in lieu of a first-order appeal to it, which, in the interests of the affirmation of a radical subjective freedom and finite humanity, it would avoid. Thus what was unique about the attack on the philosophical tradition which has here been called counter-philosophy is its apocalyptic outlook; its view of being itself the legitimate issue of philosophical history whose final chapter it would write. Thus for nineteenth century scientism the upshot of intellectual history is the final conquest of the liberal-scientific spirit over a pre-enlightened cultural past epitomized in religious and metaphysical superstition. Absolutism on the other hand would find liberation in escape from a dehumanized, reason-ridden past into a present existentialized subjectivity. Both would repudiate philosophical history and give starkly contradictory accounts of it. For their sole interest in history was imaginatively to exploit it as a means of furthering a contemporary confrontation between contrasting views of what ultra-modern liberation means: for one the triumph of humanism and technology over a benighted past, the other a triumph of subjective life over abstraction and morality. The point is, for all their popular influence, the narratives which Nietzsche, Marx and their contemporaries imposed on the history of western art, religion and philosophy were not only mutually contradictory, they are fictional and ideological, not really "histories" at all. Yet these not only still enjoy a preeminence, but compete with, and have largely supplanted the comprehension of the authentic western legacy on its own terms.

The meta-philosophies of the 20th century are extensions of absolutist and scientistic beginnings but differ in no longer seeing themselves as a culmination of world-philosophical history but as opposing to it entirely new, "contemporary" insights into the foundations of philosophy itself. They would thus seek to occupy an independent ultra-modern standpoint from which to view the arguments of the past in terms of the basic misconceptions on which they were alleged to rest which would now be their business critically to reexamine and correct. Its approach to traditional philosophy would be to root the whole of it in some alleged specific fallacy - forgetfulness of being, misuse of language, wilful transcendence of fact, a category mistake. Accordingly the great classical works were energetically reviewed, rewritten and retaught from some such perspective - Heideggerean, Rylean, Wittgensteinian - with the result that by mid-century a whole new generation of academic philosophers had become thoroughly imbued with
reconstructed interpretations of Plato, Spinoza or Kant which not only openly conflicted with the originals but violently with each other.

The history of philosophy was thus the object of a systematic, comprehensive distortion from which it has yet to recover, carried out in order to legitimize contemporary concepts that would lay hold of and express the absolute commitment to a present, con-temporal human self-consciousness and world. The enterprise fell into two general camps, an Anglo-American which positively embraced a behaviouristic anthropology and liberal-technocratic ideals and chiefly enlisted logic and language in its service; and a Continental-European which sought to refuse and stand against just this humanist, technocratic modernity through a cultivated pessimism which would turn philosophical thinking into a kind of ponderous lament that might fill the void created by the loss of a metaphysical tradition.³⁸

For post-modernism again, the history of thought as a whole is judged no longer meaningful so that even the distinction between contemporary and traditional philosophy is likewise meaningless. The ruin of the western cultural legacy lies at its feet; it constructs, reconstructs or deconstructs it at its pleasure since the life has gone out of it. If, as Rorty puts it, philosophy may once have been a useful tool for articulating the ideal enhancement of the human condition, in a liberal-technocratic society that is already free it must be abandoned as an outmoded, irrelevant relic. Or, as Derrida suggests, while there can be no desire to rejuvenate a wholly discredited philosophical literature, there might still be a virtue in rummaging about in its rubble to confirm and remind ourselves of our intellectual emancipation from all its reasons and positions.

With the idea of a meaningful tradition thus put to rest one way or the other, everything can now be put on one post-modernist plane; Plato can enter into dialogue with Freud, Gide be mated with Hegel, rock poets refute Kant, the western canon dumped because patriarchal or Christian theology is daily refuted in undergraduate seminars. In academe a belligerent antipathy to the whole legacy of reason has become pervasive, inclusive not only of historical culture but also of modernity itself. This outlook is sustained through popular declamations against the relevance of the past or against the very idea of reasoned argument having any exclusive rights in the aftermath of the overthrow of intellect; or else through exquisitely convoluted, literary-aesthetic arguments that would so thoroughly fragment and relativize meaning as to prevent any possible recurrence of the dread disease of definite thought.

What ultra-modernism would articulate is the extreme ideal of Modernity as fully and literally actual, a concretely present condition in which every reality or value has been thoroughly assimilated to the interests and perspectives of existing individuals who are subjectively convinced of their absolute freedom and of the world as subordinate to that freedom. This human-existential condition it affirms as one already or virtually

³⁸ Colourful insight into the existential sense of loss of a metaphysical tradition as the root of the Heideggerean account of "denken" is provided by Rorty in "Overcoming the Tradition" (Consequences of Pragmatism, Minnesota, 1982).
accomplished, thus such as exists before all mediations of history, culture or thought. For this reason it violently disengages itself from such mediations, even those of its own western-intellectual legacy from which it draws its ideals and its language. To the latter's notion of a reasonable, universal and objective freedom it opposes the contrary extreme of a finite, temporal, pragmatic, contingent and wholly subjective one. But as this latter vision in the end is bound to contradict its own very ideal of a concretely realized human freedom it falls into a scepticism where freedom itself becomes dissipated, confused and degenerate.

For in its post-modern form ultra-philosophy has discovered that since it can never complete the intellectual overthrow of reason, its only recourse is sceptically to suspend or abandon it. But in this it forfeits all legitimacy as philosophy and reaches an impasse beyond which, as it itself admits, it is impossible to go. In this sceptical form the ultra-modernist revolt is thus paralysed in its tracks; it can neither establish any position beyond the philosophical tradition nor can it return to it, nor can it give it up. The worlds now confronting each other are no longer some one ultra-modernist doctrine set against another - scientism contra absolutism, liberalism contra existentialism - nor is it the triumph of "contemporary" over "traditional" philosophy. It is now the philosophical legacy as a whole in its historical integrity on the one hand, and the utterly destroyed, annihilated post-modern account of it on the other. Thus, it can no longer make sense either to remain attached to the ultra-modernist critique or to the one-sided defense of traditional thought as against it. From a viewpoint no longer intimidated by the biases which have dominated the past two centuries it has become feasible to begin to speak of the ultra-philosophical project as having reached its limit, making it possible to recover again the connection between this revolt and the actual philosophical legacy it thought to abandon. The issue thereby shifts to become that of how the western tradition is after all to be reconciled to its ultra-modernist critique, or contrariwise, how the ultra-modern demand for a concrete and worldly human freedom is to recover its roots in philosophical world-history. This implies a number of obvious challenges: to reinstate and liberate the authentic philosophical legacy from its ultra-philosophical distortions; to revisit the question as to what inspired the ultra-modernist revolution, what underlies its hostility to the philosophical spirit, and how it came to its present post-modernist impasse; overall to restore the sense of the unity, wholeness, continuity and the substance of world-philosophical culture as comprehensive of and moving beyond the now tiresome negativity of the ultra-modernist preoccupation with a history "broken in two".  

39 The important point is that the ultra-modernist revolt did not "reject" the philosophical tradition; it co-opted and misconstrued it in order to take certain of its key principles to their extreme. It is this legacy of co-optive distortion that has, however, rendered the present time largely incapable of philosophy as traditionally understood since it no longer has a clear idea what it is or was on its own terms. The recovery of the actual western tradition of thought is for this reason a paramount challenge of the times, and a prime objective of Animus, the journal in which the present essay appears.
The Recovery Of A Comprehensive View Of Greek Tragedy

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An accurate view of Greek Tragedy is currently very much a desideratum. While in the poetical world of Tragedy, a human individuality is formed through the imitation of the gods by participation in the life of Family and State, contemporary views obscure this divine-human dialectic. Falling within the logic developed by Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy, they assume a human individuality complete in itself and make it the subject of the tragic action. ¹

At stake in the recovery of a comprehensive view of Greek Tragedy is not mere archaeological exactness, but a right understanding of our spiritual history, ancient and modern. Tragedy has played an essential role in the development of that Hellenic spirit which together with the Judaic has animated our Western and Christian civilization. Moreover, a profound enthusiasm for Greek Tragedy has captured the European imagination since the end of the eighteenth century, and a deeper interpretation than that of Nietzsche is necessary to make that enthusiasm comprehensible.

This article proposes, therefore, first to locate Tragedy in its general spiritual context, by presenting it as a further development of the spiritual world that the war between the Titans and Olympians has established. Second, it will argue that the Nietzschean view of tragedy does not respect the primacy of the Olympian gods in the formation of human individuality. Third, in a consideration of Antigone it proposes to suggest an Interpretation of one tragedy in accord with the principles expressed more generally in the first two parts of the article. Lastly, it will seek to show that in its discovery of a rational humanity imitative of the gods lies the true interest of tragedy both as part of our history and our contemporary life.

¹ This does not imply that contemporary critics are professed Nietzscheans or even have read him. Rather it means that in their treatment of the divine-human relation they are able no more than Nietzsche to maintain the centrality of the gods but instead put humans centre-stage, and reduce the gods to being expressions of human emotions and states, the remnants of a mythological world, or a senseless fatality. For example Denys Page (Agamemnon, eds. Denys Page and J. Denniston, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, p.xxii) can call the reconciliation of Athens and the Furies in the Oresteia only "an artificial contrivance." Sir Richard Jebb (Sophocles, Part III, Amsterdam, A.M. Hakkert, 1971, p. xx) reduces the Antigone to a conflict between the "duty of obeying the State's laws" and "the duty of listening to the private conscience." E.R. Dodds, in his edition of Bacchae ((Oxford, Clarendon Press, second edition, 1960, p. xiv) says that we see in this play that "we ignore at our peril the demand of the human spirit for Dionysiac experience." Dodds has thus reduced the awful worship of a god to human psychology.
First, the world of Tragedy, as that of Homeric Epic, assumes the result of the war between the Olympian gods and the Titanic powers, i.e. the more rational powers such as Zeus, Apollo and the like have overthrown the nature powers, and the undeveloped spiritual gods such as Dike and Nemesis, associated with them. The poet then shows a collision that is at once human and divine within the spiritual world that the triumph of the Olympians has created. This collision can result from a conflict within the polis or between an essential aspect of the polis and the earlier Titanic realm. The result is a unified divine-human cosmos.

The differences among the three great tragedians arise from their peculiar treatments of this unification, and especially from their differences in presenting the particular balance of divine and human through whose action the unification is accomplished. This can be best illustrated by well-known examples from each tragedian. In the Oresteiaë of Aeschylus, the conflict appears first as a human conflict, between Orestes and his mother Clytaemnestra; the son asserts, on behalf of his father, the rights of marriage, by killing his mother, while Clytaemnestra asserts the inviolable tie of mother to son. This conflict is clarified first by the collision of the gods who embody these different rights, Apollo, who represents the Olympian right of marriage, and the Furies, who represent the more Titanic right of the blood-tie. Only Zeus' daughter, however, acting for her father, can reconcile these rights. She does so by giving the primacy to what Apollo represents, and then acknowledging the Furies by drawing them into the polis of Athens as necessary supporters of this Olympian institution. Thus, while the reconciliation can be effected only by Athena, only the polis can be the locus of that reconciliation.

Sophocles does not like Aeschylus show the realm of the Olympian gods in its foundation through the drawing of the Titanic realm into itself. Rather, assuming the establishment of the Olympian world, he shows the tragic hero discovering that he must reverence equally the gods of the upper world and the lower world, by living in both the State and the Family: the gods of the upper world protect the State, while the gods of the underworld protect the Family. Thus in Antigone, for example, Creon learns to his ruin that he cannot so govern the State as to make it sovereign over the family obligations of Antigone, and she learns that she cannot disregard the State in so fulfilling them.

This catastrophe joins together human activity with the realm of divine essentaility. Both Creon and Antigone have a total experience of divinity, which is revealed thereby as itself radically one. Creon has experienced first, the rational and active subjectivity of the ruler, which belongs to the gods of the upper world, and in the course of the play comes to experience the opposite extreme, the pure potentiality of Hades and the Family; the movement between these two extremes constitutes his tragic career. Antigone experiences the same unification of opposites but begins from the side of the Family, and ends with particular subjectivity. Thus in Sophoclean tragedy humanity realizes itself by experiencing at the same time catastrophe and actual imitation of the gods. Thus Sophoclean drama ends with the ambiguity that, while human subjectivity has no reality independent of divine life, humans and not gods make the divine reality actual.
Euripides presents a tragic world in which, at the same time, the division between Titanic and Olympian again appears and the relation between the drama and the spectator becomes explicit. In the *Bacchae* Dionysus himself causes the collision between the Bacchic unification with nature and the institutional life of the Family and State. At the beginning of the play the god announces to the audience, a type of address unique to Euripides amongst the tragedians, that his divinity has been slighted by his own family. Since he is a son both of Zeus and a mortal woman, this means that not only is participation in the life of family and State part of the due worship of Zeus, but also the mystical union with nature made real in his son. The play shows the dreadful consequences for humanity of not properly integrating this mysticism with the life of the polis, but as indicated before, the absolute necessity of this happening if the gods are to be properly acknowledged. The play ends with this dilemma facing not only the characters of the drama, but the audience as well.

Aristophanic Comedy then indicates that only an actual individual can unite the Titanic and Olympian elements concretely. No god and no merely poetic hero can accomplish this, but only the comic hero, drawn from the most vulgar elements of contemporary Athenian life, and then purged of this vulgarity. The comic hero reduces all divine essentiality to moments of his activity and thus marks the end of Greek religion.  

In each of the tragedians only the entire drama indicates to the hero and the spectator the true nature of human and divine life. At the beginning of the drama, the central characters have a limited, one-sided view of divinity, and their action is animated by a similarly partial view of humanity. Only the hero's (or heroes') experience of an opposed aspect of both human and divine life then indicates the true nature of each. Often the revelation of a deeper view of both humanity and the gods comes only at the expense of the heroes' death. In the *Women of Trachis* for example, both Deianeira and Heracles experience the whole realm of divinity; yet Heracles ends by commanding his own death, while his wife has already killed herself. Thus while it is always human action that leads to the disclosure of the divine and human natures, this action always arises only as a certain imitation of the gods.

If, then, one should imagine an allegedly complete and self-subsistent human individual as from the beginning the subject of the drama, this would altogether obscure the meaning of Greek Tragedy. Such an assumption, however, animates the various interpretations of Tragedy offered over the last century and a half, and has rendered tragedy altogether opaque to contemporaries. *The Birth of Tragedy*  by Friedrich Nietzsche offers the deepest expression of this contemporary view, and an examination of it, although brief, will go far in indicating why our age can little understand that Tragedy which draws us so powerfully.  

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2 *Birds* indicates this explicitly; at the end of the play, the sovereignty of Zeus passes to the mortal hero.
4 George Steiner's book *Antigones* has a wealth of quotations to show the hold of *Antigone* on the modern imagination.
Nietzsche's view of tragedy is based on a distinction seemingly original with him, between the Dionysian and the Apollonian. The latter is the *principium individuationis*, the former the ground of the human's sense of himself as joined to 'being', which is really a 'becoming'. Normally, says, Nietzsche, these two principles operate separately, but in Tragedy they are brought together. There, he argues, the human being in his assumed individuality has the veil removed from his eyes and discovers that his true existence is as nothing less than Being itself; the existence of a world over and above the truly free individual is thus revealed as utterly illusory.

The excellence of Nietzsche's view lies in his knowledge that Tragedy reveals a truth not previously known about human nature, and that this truth is the relation of humanity to ultimate reality. However, as the argument *supra* has indicated, Nietzsche misconstrues the nature not only of man and ultimate reality but the relation between the two. The nature of the gods and of men in Tragedy assumes the victory of the Olympian gods over their predecessors, the Titans; there then occurs both a human and divine movement toward a more concrete relation of these elements than indicated in this myth. While the hero moves toward a concreteness analogous to the gods, the action always revealed his action as depending on the gods as its ground. Thus Nietzsche's idea of 'being' as that which describes the human individual's true existence as the ultimate reality does not properly acknowledge the concrete rule of reason which is essential to Tragedy's account of both divinity and humanity. Nor can Nietzsche account for the difference between man and god that Tragedy also maintains.

Nietzsche's obscuring of the divine-human relation has its ground in his distinction between Apollo and Dionysus. Apollo does not simply represent a *principium individuationis*, nor Dionysus simply the union with Being. In *Oedipus the King*, Apollo illumines not only the man who solves riddles by human reason, but the seer who has an unmediated knowledge as a servant of the god. Apollo is the god both of the individual *par excellence* and of him who proves to be his nemesis. Nor is Dionysus alone the god who leads men to find their individuality in a mystic union with nature. As the patron of both Tragedy and Comedy, he leads men to a deeper sense of that individuality, in Tragedy to know their dependence on the Olympian gods whom they imitate, and in Comedy to know themselves as the true actuality of these same gods.

If the *Bacchae* of Euripides were the only tragedy extant, one might be moved to agree with Nietzsche's definition of the Dionysian. In that play Bacchus does lead those women oppressed by the rigidities of life in the *polis* away from the city to Mount Cithaeron, there to enjoy the wholeness of union with nature. The king who would rule by a purely technological reason nevertheless is attracted to the god but can experience his cult only at the expense of his utter ruin. Yet even the *Bacchae* does not fully support Nietzsche's position. Dionysian exaltation is presented not only as a great good but as the ruin of ethical institutions, King Pentheus suffering death at the hands of his unknowing mother. This ambiguous conclusion points to the need for a more comprehensive world that can do justice at once to realm of the institutions of the *polis* and a Bacchic mysticism of nature.

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In *Frogs* the comic playwright Aristophanes shows that this need for a more inclusive world is not something imposed from outside on the god Dionysus but lies in the very reality of the god himself. This play, produced about the same time that Euripides produced his *Bacchae* (405 B.C.) shows Dionysus in search of himself. He finds himself as he experiences those festivals that lead men to a knowledge of their individuality, and in all three of these, he communicates the life of the gods to men. First, as associated with the mystery cults, he helps men to participate in the life of nature. Then he experiences Tragedy as the festival of his that leads men to a knowledge of themselves as citizens. Since Dionysus does this as the hero of a Comedy, he has experienced the unification of both these ends, the mystical union with nature, and the political realm of citizenship, for human enjoyment.

A brief analysis of the *Antigone* will illustrate the points made above. The action of the drama shows the discovery of a total human individuality through the collision of the two central characters. Each begins the drama with a one-sided view of both community and the gods but discovers in catastrophe the fulness of both. The drama shows that only by a total imitation of the divine life on which humans depend can they realize a full humanity.

The action and the knowledge of the main characters is initially divided. Antigone knows only the Family while her action presupposes the principle of the State. Creon knows only the State, while his action presupposes also the Family. This duality governs not only the two heroes but all characters, and from the beginning the movement toward the overcoming of this one-sidedness animates the action. Antigone tells her sister Ismene that despite Creon's forbidding it, they must both undertake to bury Polyneices. Antigone takes no interest in the question that concerns Creon, of whether Polyneices died fighting nobly or traitorously; nevertheless, not with the inwardness of family feeling, she makes Ismene's willingness to act on behalf of their brother the measure of her being a true sister, not only to Polyneices but to Antigone as well. Thus from the beginning she implicitly unites the givenness of family life with the active principle of the State, while avowing consciously only the principle of the family.

Creon, from the directly opposite view, announces, as he enters to forbid burial for Polyneices, and to command it for Eteocles, that only in the ruler of the State can one see the full exercise of the powers of reason. Yet he demands complete obedience to his edict from all the citizens. He decides on the edict as a king, according to political reason; but he expects the kind of obedience that a father expects from his children, given out of trust and love, not self-conscious thought. He unites in his management of the State the givenness that belongs to family life with the activity that moves the State. Thus like his adversary, he acts only in part on a known principle, ignorant in his case of the family principle that also moves him.

Between the entrance of Antigone and that of Creon, Ismene and the chorus express views that fall between these two extremes. Neither seeks to sum up the whole world of Family and State according to the logic of one of these realms, but consciously to unite aspects of both. Thus while the allegiance of Ismene is primarily to her brother, she
recognizes if not the authority, at least the power, of Creon. The chorus, while it abhors the deed of Polyneices, cannot approve the proposed punishment; they hate his attacking the State, yet revere his family's right to bury him. These intermediate characters, although they recognize more directly the two realms that do the heroes, also do so less comprehensively than the heroes eventually do.

From the beginning of the play, then, each character potentially unites the two realms of Family and State. The totality of these characters and their activity depends on Zeus, whose being underlies the entire drama without his very directly appearing. Antigone appeals to him as the god whose reality is the underworld and the Family; she makes him actual by burying her brother in obedience to the dictates of that realm. For his part, Creon worships Zeus as the god who defends the State and the upper world; he gives reality to the divine essence by decreeing that no traitor can be given honour by anyone in the State, even his family.

While the two central characters make Zeus present in the most radical way, the other characters, although less comprehensively, also do so, through the peculiar form in which they unite Family and State. An entire spiritual world thus presents itself to the imagination of the spectator. He sees the divine essence diversely and yet entirely realized through human activity in the two main institutions.

As indicated above, the first of the play's three parts shows the positions of the opposed heroes as they are in themselves. The second part then shows them in direct conflict, and the third in catastrophe and knowledge, as the ruined heroes acknowledge the realm that each has earlier rejected. Thus after the exposition of their views as indicated above, Antigone and Creon confront each other, the guard having caught Antigone in the very act of performing the forbidden deed. Creon asserts his devotion to the political realm, and the gods above, against Antigone, his own niece, who is made guilty of a capital crime by this measure. Antigone, by saying that Zeus belongs truly to the world below, and that the family is the true institution, thus declares Creon's rule to be illegitimate, and this to his very face.

The third part sees Antigone coming gradually to recognize the State, and the gods above, and Creon to acknowledge the family and the gods below. The first stage in this transformation involves their conflicting attitudes to Ismene. She appears in order to claim some share in her sister's condemnation, and immediately upon seeing her, Creon declares her guilty of the crime. This can arise only from Creon's implicit sense of family solidarity, which is altogether new; he acknowledges the family, if only as a force opposed to him. Antigone, for her part, refuses to allow her sister to share in her punishment. Just as Creon had not decided to punish Antigone until he knew her guilty of an intentional act, so she regards feeling alone as insufficient and makes the commission of an external act the condition of Ismene's suffering punishment; after being prompted by the chorus, Creon agrees. Here then Antigone looks to the more active principle of the State as her measure.
The next scene, between Creon and his son Haimon, shows how both have been involved in the realms that their explicit theories cannot understand, and how each will suffer by following his view to the end. We see that Antigone, silent here, by being betrothed to Haimon has involved herself in the beginning of a new family, and does not live only in the community that she has received from her parents. Creon has also lived in the realm that he has not consciously defended, by founding a family. When he argues with his son the latter says he speaks on behalf of the world below, a position that Creon violently rejects. Yet the only position that Creon advances in this argument is that of obedience, both in the Family and State. This is the principle, however, of a patriarchal community, which can as truly be described as a family as a State. Like Antigone, Creon assimilated the one community to the other. Also like her, he has not sensed the contradiction to his original position that he has been living, and now articulating.

Only in catastrophe do the heroes come to explicitly reverence that which they had earlier spurned. Antigone's reversal comes first, as Creon sentences her to death by being immured in a cave. Before she is led away, she bemoans her unmarried state. Since she had defended the brother-sister relation, she now desires that state of marriage which is the actuality of this given state. She had earlier spoken as if this tie to a brother, received from their parents, were sufficient to define her. The scene with Ismene had shown her making action a necessary part of the familial tie, and now she completes this by stating her desire for marriage. In choosing her defence of her brother as her greatest good, she has deprived herself of that which necessarily develops out of this good. Moreover, Antigone says that she would defy the State only in this regard, on account of this relation's uniqueness; thus at the end she recognizes that the family relation forms one aspect of a spiritual whole. By being true to her one-sided devotion to her brother, she deprived herself of the enjoyment of the fulfilment of that relation, but has a deep knowledge of the whole world of ethical relations. The untimely loss of her particular life is the cost of this comprehensive insight.

Creon's ruin results from the opposite one-sidedness. Because he has tried to govern the family according to the principles of the State, he loses his entire participation in the life of the Family, his wife and son. The catastrophe begins after Creon has reached the culmination of his one-sidedness when he has sent Antigone away to die in a tomb. Teiresias then arrives to denounce him; he accuses Creon of confounding the upper and lower worlds, i.e., the realm of the State and that of the Family. Creon's attempt to free Antigone, urged by Teiresias, is unsuccessful, with her suicide having preceded his arrival. His wife and son thereupon also kill themselves, and Creon is left, as his son earlier had sarcastically said, as the ruler of a desert.

Thus both Creon and Antigone attain, in one way, what they have desired. Creon, having asserted the State as the governing principle of community, lives only in the State, his family having died. Antigone, for her part, having asserted the givenness of family life, is left only with that, the beginning of family life in marriage being impossible for her. At the same time, however, each realizes what he has lost. Through this realization, each has a knowledge of what he has not originally taken account of. Since each has begun with one of the two opposite forms of knowledge, each now has a knowledge not
only of the family and the underworld gods associated with it, but also the State and the
gods of the upper world associated with it. Therefore, each has in his ruin a vision of the
totality of human community and the gods who underlie it.

The limit of this vision lies in the starting-point of each of the two central characters. Antigone begins with the family and underworld, Creon with the State and upper world. Thus only in their complementarity, do they fully join the two realms together. It belongs more then to the spectator, than the heroes to draw the requisite conclusions. The division between family and state, lower gods and upper, as well as between female and male, are now seen to fall within a prior unity, fully manifested only in the catastrophe of the heroes. Human activity has shown this prior unity, but since humans reveal this only in their ruin, the true priority of the divine is also thereby shown.

Thus the Nietzschean view of Tragedy as showing the identity of the particular individual with `being' cannot withstand the examination of a play central to the tragic world. The category of `being' is sufficient neither to man nor to the gods, and it cannot describe the peculiar imitation of the gods that defines tragic humanity. Nietzsche's identification of man with ultimate reality belongs to his own time, not to the original world of Tragedy.

An accurate knowledge of that Tragedy in our time no more serves a merely antiquarian curiosity than did the intellectual interest in Greco-Roman culture of previous ages in our Western and Christian civilization. Whether to find a model in art and politics or to discover a philosophy ancillary to Christian theology, our ancestors saw their relation to aspects of the ancient world as necessary to their own self-understanding. In a similar vein, we cannot understand the historical origins of the Christian religion nor the nature of a Christian secularity without understanding the world that Greek Tragedy presents to our imaginations.

A knowledge of the peculiar form in which Greek Tragedy unites humanity with the divine is essential if one is to see the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as arising not from Judaism nor Hellenic ideas alone but a perfect unification of the two. As was indicated above, Tragedy can show men finitely imitating the gods that despite their movement away from a natural beginning, remain limited. The concept of the Trinity integrates a divine-human unification with an absolutely originative and creative first principle. Tragedy, therefore, can indicate the finite moment of this concept, which Judaism cannot, and at the same time, show the need for its grounding in an originative principle, which only Judaism can supply.

Similarly the need to discover the relation of a Christian secularity to its origins has also been moving in the last two centuries' deep interest in Greek Tragedy. As the argument has shown, the hero in Tragedy experiences a deep unification of ends in his action. Through the hero's joining of family and State, and his experience thereby of the totality of the gods, the spectator has seen the relation of his own ethical world to the absolute world of religion.

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6 John 1.
The need for an analogous unification of ends has been a moving, if unconscious, force in the cultural and institutional life of the last two hundred years. Several factors are at work here. First, now that all social institutions are felt to correspond to the subjectivity of individuals, the need to know the objectivity of institutions arises very strongly. Here, the reader of Tragedy would see individuals moved by a *pathos* that was at the same time his own and a divinity. Second, the world of the last two centuries has very much asserted the rights of the family and civil society against the sovereign power of kings and the like. This is felt however not only as liberation, but also the atomizing of society. The nature of the tragic collision, whereby the hero learns that he has onesidedly identified himself with only one community, can speak very strongly to those who feel this atomization.

Third, and perhaps most important, modern society has felt the need not only to be independent of ecclesiastical authority, but also to know the relation of a free society to religion. The argument has indicated that in Tragedy the communities uniting men and women together are the very presence of the gods themselves. To an age struggling to find an analogous presence of the Christian god, Greek Tragedy is an ever-present beacon.

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7 At the very dawn of the contemporary period *The Sorrows of Young Werther* shows the striving of an individual to live out the logic of the Trinity in his daily life.
Did Aristotle Understand Plato?

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I

J.N. Findlay, in *Plato, the Written and Unwritten Doctrines* and later in *Plato and Platonism*, argues that what is implied, but not fully articulated in Plato's dialogues and letters, is given its explicit expression by Aristotle.¹ Findlay maintains that Aristotle's representation of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' is consistent with the Platonic position as it is disclosed in the dialogues and must, therefore, be accepted as an accurate statement of Plato's teachings.² According to Findlay, Aristotle presented a simple and explicit statement of the Principles and Elements which animate the Dialogues, whose literary form prevented Plato from revealing directly what was guiding the discussions between his interlocutors.

On the occasion of Findlay's festschrift, J.A. Doull celebrated Findlay's contribution to Platonic studies. Findlay is presented in Doull's paper as providing "an account of the Platonic philosophy according to its own principles" in contrast to other scholars, who have passed over the Elements and Principles "as dry and empty abstractions".³ Doull agrees with Findlay in rejecting Schleiermacher's widely supported view that Aristotle's representation of Plato's doctrines must be dismissed on the philological judgement that they are inadequately reflected in the Dialogues. Doull writes: "With this fashion has always gone a more or less unconscious reading into Plato by scholars of the philosophical interests of their day. Measured by Neo-Kantian, Analytic or some other modern attitude, Aristotle's account of Platonism was philosophical nonsense, and the philological weighing and dismissing of evidence was in the end governed by alien philosophical attachments."⁴ Findlay's distinguishing merit is his ability to recognize the original Platonism in Aristotle's exposition of the teachings of the Academy.

At the centre of Findlay's interpretation of Platonism is a critical evaluation of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic philosophy. He sharply distinguishes between the

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² Findlay *Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, pp. 455-473.
⁴ Ibid., 254-55.
Aristotle whom he regards as a faithful recorder of his master's teachings, and the Aristotle whom he condemns as a thoroughly misguided and incompetent Platonic commentator. Indeed, the capacity to understand Platonism according to its own assumptions, which Doull attributes to Findlay, Findlay denies Aristotle. Did Aristotle understand the Platonic philosophy? Findlay's answer is emphatically 'no'. Aristotle, according to Findlay, was burdened with assumptions which would have served him well, if he had become "the ingenious empiricist and logical analyst that many think that he was," but which had the unfortunate consequence of rendering the Platonic philosophy unintelligible to its most influential interpreter. Findlay's Aristotle is the father of an heretical understanding of his master's teaching which has won support from his own time until, in the present era, the distortion has reached its most exaggerated expression by scholars such as Cherniss. Doull joins Findlay in giving first authority to Aristotle's evidence against Cherniss and others, but maintains against Findlay that the most philosophically insightful and accurate exposition of Plato's philosophy is to be found in the works of Aristotle.

II

In an admirable discussion, Findlay characterizes what he calls 'the stoicheiological dialogues' (Cratylus, Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus) as leading the argument beyond an eidetic reflection upon the state or the soul or virtue or whatever, which assumes rather than explicates the unifying principles, to a consideration of the stoicheia and archai of the eide and their appearances. He presents the very questionable view that the argument of 'stoicheiologocial dialogues' is partly a response to an "older pluralistic idealism" current in the Academy at that time. Aristotle, it is suggested, may have belonged to this opposition which Plato was addressing. Aristotle's critical presence in the Academy is found in the Parmenides where Plato responds to the misinterpretations of his theory of Ideas. He notes with delight that "in the latter parts of the dialogue the rather miserable man who makes the responses is called 'Aristotle'. Findlay also finds Aristotle present in Plato's Sophist. Aristotle "fits the characterization of the Giants in the Sophist, men who want to drag everything down from heaven to earth and who believe in nothing that they cannot touch or handle." Platonism is presented as a pure systematic idealism against Aristotelianism; the latter contains a residue of empiricism which is

5 Findlay, Plato, and Platonism, 213.
6 Findlay, Written and Unwritten Doctrines, 210.
7 Doull comments: "Findlay thinks that possibly Aristotle may have belonged to a part of the opposition. That Aristotle was ever a patron of the abstract understanding as against dialectical revision and insight is a suggestion no doubt excusable to a Platonist. More seriously, one may question whether "an older pluralistic idealism," as it is nowhere unchallenged in the earlier Dialogues, was ever taught in the Academy. It therefore appears simpler to suppose that the opponents, Gods and Giants or whatever, are fictional abstractions used to bring to light logically the nature of a concrete dialectic, all the while employed, and in practice generally recognized, in the Academy." Doull, "Findlay and Plato," 257.
8 Findlay, Plato and Platonism, p. 144
9 Ibid., 210
incompatible with the eidetic insights Aristotle borrowed from Platonism: "Aristotle is a dualist, which Plato is not, and he believes in Matter as some sort of real stuff on which eidetic activity is exercised, thus constituting the realm of Nature."\(^{10}\) Aristotle is an 'instantialist', in Findlay's view, in the sense that he maintains that primary reality is the individual, the tode ti, and further that the tode ti is material, and materiality is understood as a contrary which stands opposed to ideality. Aristotle's matter, in other words, is sensible stuff and not a principle for thought.

Platonism, in sharp contrast, is the systematic philosophy of the One: "Only Unity Itself, which is also Being and Goodness and Beauty Itself, is given anything like an ontological status by Plato, all else being only its specifications or instantiations, whether material or psychic, and even though Plato, like his remote disciple, the pseudo-Dionysius, prefers to think of it in terms of a superesse rather than an esse."\(^{11}\) Plato's problem is to show how there can be anything other than Unity Itself and his solution is to deny that there is, in a strict sense. Aristotle, in Findlay's view, has the opposite problem and ends up with a plurality of logical and ontological distinctions, which he can only gather together in the form of a list, since he has lost sight of Unity as the ultimate principle of thought and being.\(^{12}\) Aristotle is wilfully unsystematic, indeed, anti-philosophical and anti-Platonic. Any suggestion that the Aristotelian philosophy may be understood as involving a correction of the original Platonic position, and a further development of it, is dismissed.

Findlay defends Plato against what he regards as an Aristotelian inversion of Plato's 'Great Inversion'. The 'Great Inversion' is "the erection of instances into ontological appendages of Ideas rather than the other way round."\(^{13}\) Aristotle is a 'quasi-instantialist' (Cherniss is a pure instantialist) who "is unable to conceive that for Plato instances are not really real at all".\(^{14}\) Indeed, Aristotle treats Plato "who does not believe in instances (as entities in their own right) as if he believed in nothing else."\(^{15}\) This results in "an almost total misunderstanding of the 'Great Inversion' which is Platonism."\(^{16}\)

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10 Findlay, *Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, 361.
11 Ibid., 472.
12 After contrasting Platonic Idealism with the standpoints which encapsulate "all ideal meaning in a comprehensive Subjectivity," Findlay writes:
"Platonism has, however, other rivals of a non-idealistic stamp, and of these the philosophical orientation which refuses to absolutize anything is, at first sight, the most formidable. This is the philosophical orientation which is quite willing to adopt different principles in different fields, and to adopt a plurality of principles in different fields, and to adopt a plurality of principles and methods in a single field, without attempting to reduce them all to something simple and single. It is the orientation which is quite willing to use eidetic insights in some fields, but which is crassly empirical in dealing with other questions, and which does not expect either its insights or its empirical findings to be all capable of being seen as radiating from a single centre, or as making a single structure or sense. Aristotelianism in antiquity, Scotism and Ockhamism in medieval times, and certain of the best forms of modern analysis, exemplify the orientation we are trying to characterize, and all are resolutely opposed to the speculative simplification or reduction or misplaced craving for universality". *Written and Unwritten*, 409-10.
14 Ibid., 209.
15 Ibid., 233.
16 Ibid., 21.
Aristotle is presented, in Findlay's account, as attempting to work out the distinction between primary and derivative senses of being in his own ontology in the form of the relation of "material individuals" to the other categories; he fails to grasp that Plato attempted the same "but working it in reverse, and that he was in fact attributing being in the unqualified sense to Ideas and only derivatively to their actual or possible instantiations."\(^{17}\) Aristotle fails to understand that Plato clearly distinguished between the "apartness" of instances from each other and the ontological and logical "apartness" of ideas from their cases or instantiations.\(^{18}\) It is Aristotle, not Plato, Findlay argues, who conceived of the Platonic Ideas in a way which rendered them subject to 'third man arguments', the innumerable fallacies of 'self-predication', and in general, of criticisms consequent upon the separation of Ideas and their instances, which leaves the Ideas either on a logical and ontological plane of equality with the instances which they are intended to explain as their causes, or in another world with no relation to the realms of sensible particulars and finite human thinking.\(^{19}\)

**III**

In a thorough treatment of Aristotle's evaluation of the Platonic philosophy it would be necessary to distinguish clearly between two very different kinds of criticism. Some criticisms are consequent upon viewing Platonic doctrines from the standpoint of the Aristotelian philosophy. Such criticisms serve to show that, for example, the Platonic relation of the *eide* to the sensible renders a science of 'sensible substance' impossible because the relation is insubstantial (i.e. what Plato means by 'participation'). The force of such a criticism is waiting for scientific demonstration of Aristotle's doctrine of substance. The important difference between Aristotle and the modern scholars, who have repeated such criticisms, is that Aristotle recognizes the philosophical demand implied in such criticism. Findlay is fully justified in defending Platonism against criticisms of this first kind. Doull offers the following very instructive comment on this matter:

The difficulties Parmenides, from 131a-135c in the dialogue named after him, brings before Socrates about 'participation' or the relation of 'the many' to the *eide* need first to be set carefully in the argument up to that point. They are difficulties peculiar to the Platonic philosophy, and are certain to be found unintelligible if considered in the light of an Aristotelian or some modern logic. That like objections are made to the Ideas by Aristotle to show that 'participation' is only an empty word and a poetical image need not mean either that he is regarding the problems from the same standpoint or that he does not understand the Platonic standpoint. That 'participation' is an empty name and an image it would not trouble Plato greatly in the end to assent to, but the words would have

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 232-233.
another emphasis than for Aristotle: they express for Plato as the truth of the matter that the relation is not 'substantial'.

In the present paper the focus will be on criticisms of another kind than those which result from viewing the Platonic philosophy from an alien perspective. Aristotle points out what he believes are ambiguities in Plato's teachings, which the Platonist must resolve if he is to maintain a consistent position and he argues that the Platonic principles do not effect the purpose they were intended to serve. Such criticisms are intended by Aristotle to be seen as arising out of the Platonic logic and ontology.

While Findlay's account of Platonism is fresh and instructive, the basic content of his treatment of Aristotelianism, and Aristotle's critique of Platonism, is important because he articulates clearly views which dominate scholarship in this area. The contrast between Plato the winged idealist, the absolutist, the theoretical mathematician, the systematic philosopher, and Aristotle the earth-bound empiricist, the biologist, the unsystematic pragmatist is a characterization familiar to anyone who would be inclined to read Findlay's works. Even Hans-Georg Gadamer, who more than most contemporary scholars sees a continuity and development in Aristotelianism from Platonism, writes: "... our first task must be to establish the perspective from which Plato's doctrine of ideas and Aristotle's critique of it may be understood: whereas in Plato it is obviously the insight into the nature of number which supports and directs his thinking and conceptualization, in Aristotle it is the insight into the nature of what lives." But these categories, however much they may be suggestive of the difference between the two philosophers, it will be suggested, are more misleading than they are instructive. Doull offers an alternative to saying that Platonism and Aristotelianism are each rooted in a different set of assumptions which leaves the two philosophies as parallel constructions which have, in the most extreme account, no common ground, or, in a more moderate account, particular points of convergence in what are otherwise fundamentally divergent orientations of thought. Aristotelianism can be seen, in his view, as arising out of the original Platonic position and as involving a revision and correction of its principles.

Rather than attempt to lay down what is essential to the very substance of the original Platonism and what is revisable in the position, it might be reasonable to form the problem in a more limited way. If it can be shown that the substance of the very charges which Findlay brings against Aristotle - that Aristotle is unsystematic which is unPlatonic, that there is a residue of empiricism in Aristotelianism which is unPlatonic, that Aristotle's matter is not a principle for thought - are in fact at the very heart of the criticisms which Aristotle brings against Plato, then by Findlay's own account the direction of Aristotle's critique of Platonism is thoroughly Platonic.

The direction of Aristotle's objections to Platonic philosophy, it will be argued, is that it retains a residue of empiricism, which grants to the external and given a primacy and

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independence, which a more complete and thorough idealism, such as Aristotle
developed, does not concede to the natural and particular. Aristotle, it will be suggested,
may be thought of as more Platonic than Plato, in that he attributed to the pantheon of
eide\footnote{Findlay, \textit{Written and Unwritten}, 324-5.} greater power and sovereignty in the universe than even Plato imagined possible.
The question, which Aristotle raises, it will be suggested, is whether Plato separated
logos from muthos, participated from participant, the Idea from its appearance, form from
matter, the One from the Dyadic principle, enough rather than too much. Was Plato able
to maintain the Good and the eide\footnote{Findlay, \textit{Written and Unwritten}, 410.} as actual and effective causes or was he condemned to
regard them as merely potential? Do the eide lose their substantiality and break down into
the elements which they are supposed to unite? Can the Platonic Good only be regarded
as a cause in the problem-riddled form of treating it as a one which stands relative to a
two? These are questions which occur internally to the logical and ontological structure
of Platonism.

IV

Findlay's Plato is "systematically systematic." Findlay, as noted above, dismisses the
duality of principles in Platonism. The Indefinite Dyad, he argues, is merely the extrinsic
side of absolute Unity, which has the consequence that the One is really responsible for
everything.\footnote{Doull, "Findlay and Plato," 253.} He argues against Heidegger's pluralism that "if one is going to be
systematic, one might as well be systematically systematic, as in Platonism or some other
absolutist system." Doull does not disagree with Findlay's view that the Indefinite Dyad
is what the One needs to be itself, but observes that this argument brings to light that the
extrinsic side is as necessary to the One as what it is in and for itself. To say that "the
negative or empty Principle which in the eidetic sphere specifies, in the instantial sphere
instantiates, is merely the extrinsic side of absolute Unity", as Findlay does, leaves the
specified and instantiated in an ambiguous relation to the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of
their Principle as the One. There is not, in this view, one way of looking at the specific
forms or the instantiated. One may choose to be systematic and consider phenomena as
ordered and limited in their relation to their eide\footnote{Findlay, \textit{Written and Unwritten}, 324-5.} which, in turn, may be regarded from the
perspective of Unity itself. But equally one may choose to be unsystematic and regard the
same as indeterminate and lawless. Doull comments that "in the end Heidegger's
pluralism and Findlay's system are complementary rather than exclusive attitudes to
Plato."\footnote{Doull, "Findlay and Plato," 253.} An ambiguity of another but related kind runs through Plato's teachings. The ultimate
principle in the \textit{Fis} spoken of as both the Good and \textit{Nous}. Reason is seen as
fundamentally and essentially teleological. It is an activity which orders the conditional,
the discursive, to an unconditional end, which is at once an object of intuition and the
effective principle of discursive thought. The Good as \textit{Nous} is thought of as ordering the
divided and finite realm of nature and ideas in accordance with itself or what is best, or
good, or rational. Scientific inquiry is seen as possible, if the objects of sense perception
stretch out, grasp at and desire to be their *eide*, to use Plato's image, and the *eide* in turn refer themselves out of their own nature to their ultimate principle. Objective dialectic is understood to depend upon the intrinsic teleological activity of nature and the *eide*. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates rejects the formal mathematical logic of Cebes and Simmias, which understands soul, for example, as being a ratio or harmony, rather than an *ousia*, which may be predicated of harmony, and indeed, of contraries. He also rejects the mechanical explanations of the *physikoi*. It is not an insight into number which is guiding Plato in this argument but the nature of an intrinsic teleological activity.

M. Sayre has shown that the following five theses which Aristotle presented in Book Alpha, Chapter 6 of the *Metaphysics*, provide the essential insight into the interpretation of Plato's *Philebus*: 25 (1) that *numbers* come from participation of 'the Great and Small' in Unity; (2) that sensible things are constituted by the *eide* and 'the Great and Small'; (3) that the *eide* are composed of 'the Great and Small' and Unity; (4) that *eide* are *numbers*, and (5) that the Good is Unity. In this account of Platonism the *eide* are composite, derivative from the more primary elements of Unity and 'the Great and Small', which according to Sayre are called *peras* and *apeiron* in the *Philebus*. Unity is, at once, viewed as an independent primary principle and as being a constitutive element in the *eide*, and through the *eide*, as an element in sensible particulars. Unity as against 'the Great and Small' is identified with the Good but not as a teleological principle. The Unlimited is constituted of opposites in which each member taken by itself is altogether indefinite and fluid, while the opposites defined through their relation to each other define a range between dyads such as long and short, or cold and hot. The *eide* are numbers as a ratio which harmonizes, for example, the unlimited dyad of high and low as the ratio of one to two generating the octave. A fourth factor is introduced in addition to limit and the unlimited and a mixing in accordance with mathematical ratio. Because limit and the unlimited neither name nor imply one another a cause for their mixing must be given: truth, or beauty, or symmetry. But these causes are, to use Aristotle's language, formal causes and not final causes.

Commentators on the *Philebus* have been puzzled because the only 'mixtures' Plato mentions in the dialogue are perfect. It should be noted that the mixtures are perfect as mathematical forms are perfect. Perhaps this is because objects which involve an activity in relation to a *telos*, objects which have the character of *eros*, which is understood in the *Symposium* to be constituted out of *poros* and *penia*, do not fall within the purview of the logic of *peras* and *apeiron*. In the relation of poverty and plenty, Plato hoped to discern the nature of an activity in relation to an end as the cyclical movement of rising out of poverty and falling back into it. Aristotle's complaint is that what Plato intends the relation of *poros* and *penia* to yield (purposeful activity), it will not yield if it is not shown that the plenty is somehow in the poverty or, in other words, how the negative principle or poverty involves at once privation and possesses its end (plenty) as *eros*. In the middle dialogues this problem does not become evident because it is possible to view the relation imaginatively in terms of the participation of the sensible in the intelligible, which yields the realm that falls between poverty and plenty, between complete

ignorance and knowledge, between not-being and being. In the last section of this paper Aristotle's revision to this formulation will be considered. When Plato attempted to express his principles in a perfectly universal form, the problem inherent in his original formulation, in Aristotle's view, became altogether clear. The mixtures which result from bringing the Unlimited, inert mathematical matter, the dyads which designate a range of quantitative difference (short and long, wet and dry etc.) under the Limit, number or ratio or measure, are in the most abstract relation to their principle, the Good as Unity. There is no place for eros, or the sensible particulars understood as 'grasping at' their eide, or the eide as stepping stones to the Good. Rather there is the relation of One and Two and the recognition that a cause or reason for the mixing cannot come out of number, so ideas, truth, beauty, symmetry are called in. Dialectic becomes the art of division and mixing rather than the logic by which the movement from the hypothetical to an unhypothetical principle is disclosed.

It will be argued, in the next section of this paper that Plato never abandons his original intention to maintain the eide as causes of Becoming and the Good as their principle. How the philosophy of the One and Two, as Gadamer calls it, and the philosophy of the Good are to be drawn together into one systematic view, presents real difficulties of which Aristotle was deeply aware. Doull writes:

For Aristotle, the source of Plato's logical difficulties is an ambiguity between his Socratic and Eleatic affiliations. The eide are primarily of Socratic origin, or their principle is the Good. The principle of the Numbers is, rather, the One. The teleological generation of nature for the Animal Itself is, for example, of Socratic inspiration. It comes from revised Eleaticism that the Animal Itself is thought to be a very complex relation of numbers. The Platonist need not give in to such objections. But perhaps he has to make a choice whether the Socratic, teleological perspective is primary and the mathematical instrumental...26

The original Platonism, according to this account, must be seen as developing two distinct directions. While at the same time, Plato's intention, in contrast to Speusippus and Zenocrates, was to maintain a philosophy of the Good, the Beautiful as well as the One. The problem of drawing a Socratic and a revised Eleatic orientation together into one consistent view may not be the problem providence called upon Plato to solve, but rather, the problem of formulating the problem. "The extreme importance of this first Platonism," Doull writes, "and why it should be kept firmly apart from all later Platonic accretions, however excellent, is that it permits a simple but adequate insight, not into episteme or science, but into its elements, or into the logic of the first formation and separation of the sciences."27

The task which Plato set himself in the *Phaedo* continued to be his focus throughout in his later dialogues. His criticism of Anaxagoras in the *Phaedo* is that rather than explaining objects which become in terms of the operation of Intelligence he introduced ancillary causes. In Anaxagoras' position, according to Socrates, there was, at once, the insight that everything must be referred to an ultimate principle as its source and end, and alongside of that, the appearance of a separate 'science', which considered phenomena as explained in terms of a plurality of causes, which were unrelated to his rational principle or merely empirically derived. What was required was to draw the totality of nature and thought together into one view, in a way which leaves not even a particle of being or not-being as something merely taken empirically in its givenness or facticity. Plato rejects both abstract subjective idealism, such as he finds with the sophists, which leaves the realm of appearances as an unexplained presupposition for a measuring subject, and an abstract objective idealism, such as he finds with the Eleatics, which presupposes the divided realm of becoming in order that through its negation the One or Being itself may be laid down as all that is. The Eleatic and sophistic dialectics are rejected because they both are dependent upon an assumed finitude which leaves the sensible in its givenness as unexplained and inexplicable but as a necessary presupposition to their logic.

In the later dialogues Plato has before him the conclusion of the Eleatic dialectic that there is no true finitude, but only the One itself, and the conclusion of the Sophistic dialectic that there is only being for another or appearances, and nothing determinate in itself. Both dialectics share in common that they render impossible from opposed sides meaningful discourse or purposeful activity in relation to a limited but objective good. Against this background the Platonic dialectic is intended to show how there can be stable limited determinations which would save discourse, disclose how the soul in its relation to both the sensuous and the intelligible has a relation to the Good, and how the limited determinations out of themselves are causes of change and externality.

"In the *Sophist* he has shown", Prof. Doull writes, "how there can be a definite otherness or finitude for a theoretic thought, namely by a limitation of indeterminate difference in relation to an absolute identity. In this way is constituted both an unchanging ideal world of genera and their species and a changing sensible participation of this order." In the *Statesman* Plato asks how there can be an alternative to the theocratic ideal which does not allow for a participation in the divine freedom which is its principle. His intention is to show how the desire for natural well-being is to be viewed in relation to the absolute divine Good. In the *Philebus* Plato attempts to show how the ideas and sensible can be brought together practically in relation to the Good as effectively present in finite determinations; 'the mixed life' is presented as a higher

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28 For a precise and thorough consideration of this matter see J.A. Doull, "A Commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Dionysius*, I, (1977), 5-49.
29 *Sophist* 258d ff.
30 See particularly the introduction and conclusion of *Parmenides*. See also *Sophist*, 260a ff., *Philebus*, 14d ff.
32 *Statesman*, 271c-275a.
determination of the Good than the life of thought or pleasure taken in isolation.\textsuperscript{33} In the *Timaeus* Plato looks at the coming into being of the manifold world of change as a kind of showing of the Good in which image and the imaged are sustained in their relativity to the Good.\textsuperscript{34}

A central focus of Plato's thought in the later dialogues is to define the region between the poles of pure Becoming, or what is absolutely indeterminate, which he interprets to be the position of the sophists, and the standpoint of the One itself, or what is absolutely determinate, as simply other than, and not greater than, the finite which he takes to be the Eleatic position. He introduced a new dialectic to solve this problem. Somehow it was necessary to maintain the sophistic determination of relativity or being-for-another, which the sophists had grasped while referring everything back to a principle such as the Eleatic One, which in this new light, will be seen as sustaining what is other than itself in its interdependence in a relation of absolute dependence upon the One itself. Plato's dialectic was intended to integrate division and contrariety into an objective unity.

VI

In *Parmenides* Plato recognizes the problems inherent in the notion of 'participation' by considering what is consequent upon the hypothesis that the *eide* are separate from 'the many'.\textsuperscript{35} Socrates proposes this hypothesis in response to what he interprets to be Zeno's argument: 'If things are many, the many will be both like and unlike, since this is impossible, there are not many.'\textsuperscript{36} Socrates' problem is to show how there can be many.

The difficulty Zeno presents is that contraries do not combine: the notion of 'many' is taken by Zeno to be contradictory because 'many ones' involves combining the like with the unlike. Socrates' solution is to say that while contraries do not combine, one thing may participate in contrary forms such as unity and plurality, sameness and difference, being and not-being. A knowing subject can view Socrates as many in one relation (right side, left side, upper and lower parts) and in another relation as one (one person among the seven present).\textsuperscript{37} Both oneness and plurality are present for a viewing subject but not objectively. Socrates' concern is to save the finite sensible realm and discourse against the Eleatic One by explaining 'the many' as participants in self-identical *eide*. This reflection is unsatisfactory because it may be understood as leading to the sort of conclusion reached by the Socratic dialectic (that one cannot know whether Socrates is objectively one or many) or by the Sophistic dialectic (that one can prove whichever one wishes). What underlies both the Socratic and Sophistic dialectics is an assumed division between *eidos* and 'participant' such that it falls to an external subject to connect the two.\textsuperscript{38} Parmenides' criticisms, in the dialogue named after him, force Socrates to give up

\textsuperscript{33} *Philebus*, 61a ff.
\textsuperscript{34} *Timaeus*, 27d ff.
\textsuperscript{35} *Parmenides*, 128e-135c.
\textsuperscript{36} *Parmenides*, 127e.
\textsuperscript{37} *Parmenides*, 129c.
\textsuperscript{38} *Phaedo*, 101d: Platonic-Socrates explains Sophistic reasoning by saying that 'the many', which participate in an *eidos*, at once are images of what they participate in and are like their *eidos* but they are
the assumed separation of *eidos* and 'participant' and to regard them as relative to each other and sustained in their relativity by the One itself. Aristotle repeats these objections because they belong in any comprehensive critique of Platonism, and because, to anticipate the argument of the present paper, Plato is never altogether free of them.

The elements or principles, undivided unity and dividedness, which constitute the 'participants' come to light through the Platonic-Parmenides criticisms of 'participation'. What is hidden in the poetic language of 'participation' is a contradiction which becomes the focus of Plato's thought in the *Parmenides*. The new Platonic dialectic, which the Platonic-Parmenides introduces, is intended to be the objective dialectic of the One itself. In this new dialectic hypotheses are laid down as merely "stepping-stones and points of departure" to the Good. The Platonic-Parmenides' correction of Socrates' position is precisely that the hypotheses of 'the many', the *eide*, and the Good must be treated strictly as hypothetical starting points and not as fixed and determinate logical and ontological divisions. What is required is to maintain the Parmenidean One as a principle which is other than the plurality of ideas, which makes discursive thought possible, and 'the many', which constitute the sensible world, but with the further development that the One must be seen as a productive principle and not merely an abstraction beyond its product. The new dialectic is intended to show the One as the origin and end of 'the many' and the *eide* by negating their posited independence.

The task is to carry out the proposed programme in the *Republic*: to proceed dialectically which "without relying on anything sensible uses only ideas in order to proceed from ideas to other ideas, and to end in ideas." The problems of participation do not disappear. The *eide* take into themselves the relation of participated and participant, and the question of how they are sustained in that relation appears. The need to go back from the *eide* to the principles which sustain them in their relativity appears

It is this step which leads Plato in the direction of a mathematized Eleatic philosophy. In the *Parmenides* Plato looks to a principle which it is hoped will not fall into the division of content and logical form, being and self-identity. Plato's earlier formulations of the ultimate principle (the Good or the Beautiful or *Nous*) are not considered as possible candidates. One might reasonably conjecture as follows: once the logical demand was present to distinguish clearly between the *eide* and their Principles or Elements, the terms Good, Beautiful, and *Nous* were thought to have the character of qualified being like the *eide*. The solution appeared to be to look to Unity Itself or the One and to disclose what it yields. This led Plato in the direction of Eleaticism. It also led Plato into the mathematical because whatever differences the One can yield are quantitative. What is not the One itself is many, what is not Unity Itself is unlimited,

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39 See Doull's "The Problems of Participation in Plato's *Parmenides*" for a thorough and definitive discussion of Parmenides' criticisms of 'participation'.
40 *Republic*, 511b.
41 *Parmenides*, 135d ff.
42 *Republic*, 511b
indeterminate. The Elements out of which everything had to be generated, in this view, are contraries, Unity and Plurality and contraries which follow from these contraries as starting points.

The particular criticism which may be usefully considered in the concluding section of this paper concerns Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic doctrine that everything finite is composed of contraries. This teaching is consistently maintained by Plato throughout his dialogues.

VII

Was Plato forced by his own logic to assert that the cause of becoming and plurality does not belong to the operation of Intelligence or the Good but rather to an ancillary cause, not-being or a dyadic principle? This conclusion Aristotle accurately understands to be precisely what Plato hoped to avoid. Does Aristotle's correction of Plato's position result in a view more satisfactory to Plato's own intention than Plato himself was able to achieve?

Aristotle says that Plato recognized the problem which Parmenides and Anaxagoras or Democritus left unaddressed. Plato sought to find a compromise between 'one' and 'infinitely many' principles. More specifically, the question had taken the definite form for Plato of how contraries and what connects them are to be integrated. Aristotle says that Plato fell prey to numerous difficulties because of the way in which he formed the problem. Namely, Plato makes every principle an element and he makes contraries his principles and the One or Unity a principle.

Aristotle allows that this logical structure is an advance beyond Plato's predecessors but argues that while Plato was able to formulate the dilemma he was not able to solve it in terms of his own logic.

43 In the first book of Physics Aristotle treats the Platonists last because he views them as having seen clearly the problem uniting Parmenides' Being with becoming and change. Plato's predecessors accepted the absolute separation of being and not-being which had the consequence that 'becoming' must be shown to somehow come out of the character of not-being itself. Professor A.M. Johnston writes, "If on the one hand one affirms the absolute distinction of Parmenides and on the other that becoming comes out of opposites, one is condemned, in Aristotle's view, to asserting two distinct principles, the connection between which is left unclarified." A Commentary on the First Two Books of Aristotle's Physics, (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1985), p. 140. In Sophist Plato proposes a way by which being and not-being can be connected in the determination of not-being as 'otherness' or heteron. The megista gene, and the eide generally, are intended to provide the connection between not-being or pure indeterminacy and absolute identity or pure being both at the eidetic level as representing an unchanging and stable but limited order of genera and species, and at the sensible level as the sharing and not-sharing of sensible particulars in their eide. Aristotle's criticism is that in Plato the relation of the eide to 'the many', the eide to each other, and an eidos in its identity and difference in relation to the Good or One ultimately comes down to the relation of the One and an indeterminate dyad which simply remain apart.

44 In Sophist 254b-256c Plato's proposed megista gene are intended to be determinations of stable limited distinctions which are at once the most primary forms and the causes of externality and change.

45 Metaphysics, 1092a5-9
Aristotle says of the Platonists in Book Nu of the *Metaphysics* that "they thought that all things that are would be one (viz. Being itself), if one did not join issue with and refute the saying of Parmenides: 'For never will this be proved, that things that are not are.' They thought it necessary to prove that which is not is; for only thus - of that which is and something else - could the things that are be composed, if they are many." He introduces this comment by saying that the Platonist framed the problem in an "obsolete form".  

What is "obsolete" about the form in which Plato framed the problem in Aristotle's view? However developed Plato's principles may be they retain the character of being the elements of things rather than causes proper, and are open to the fundamental objections which Plato himself raised against the Pre-Socratics: Plato's principles at the highest level are the One and the Indeterminate Dyad; the *eide* and 'the many' are intended to be known as derivative from these principles.  

"The doctrine of the One and the Two", Professor H. Gadamer writes, "is not a step beyond the doctrine of ideas which would negate the latter but a step behind it which expresses its actual basis." Aristotle would revise Gadamer's statement to say that although Plato intended the One and the Two to provide the basis of the doctrine of ideas, his theory of ideas is rendered impossible if one accepts his Principles. If there is an actual concretion of self-identity and 'otherness' in the *eide* then the *eide* are what is primary and the One and the dyadic Principle are posterior abstractions. But if the Principles are truly principles what is other than them must be constituted out of absolute identity and pure indeterminacy, which is impossible, because contraries do not combine. What is lacking is a context within which the indeterminate could 'become', and is potentially, the determinate. While the determination of not-being as otherness or *heteron* marks a profound advance from the Eleatic separation of Being and not-being, the connection of being to what is other than being can only be made by a thinking which is external to what is to be connected. The difference between the

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46 *Metaphysics*, 1088b35- 1089a6; See *Parmenides*, 52 sq. and for Plato's discussion of this passage *Sophist*, 258c.

47 Findlay's division of the Platonic dialogues into 'Socratic', 'Ideological' and 'Stoicheiological' provides the most philosophically reasonable and instructive arrangement of Plato's writings. Aristotle similarly distinguishes between Platonism as it assumes the hypotheses of the Good itself, the *eide*, and 'the many' and considers what follows from them, and Platonism which treats the hypotheses as merely hypothetical and investigates their principles or elements. Findlay writes: "From the Dialogues of Plato's 'middle period', which we have called 'ideological' since the Ideas, the *Eide*, furnish the main pivot upon which the argument turns, we proceed to another set of Dialogues, presumed to be later in date, which we may call the 'stoicheiological' or 'principal' Dialogues, since their emphasis is not so much on the *Eide* as on the Elements (*stoicheia*) or Principles (*archai*) of the same *Eide*. The Elements or Principles of the *Eide* are said by Aristotle to have been the One, the Principle of *ousia*, substantial reality, on the one hand, and the Great and Small, or Principle of the Indefinite or Infinite on the other, the former being both a good and an active Principle, and the latter a bad and passive one, and the second being operative in the instantial as well as in the ideal realm (*Physics*, 203a)." Findlay, *Written and Unwritten*, 210. The treatment of the Good as a One and what is other than the One as a Two is already present in the *Parmenides* where a mathematized Eleatic Platonism is developed which is intended to show the derivation the *eide* and 'the many' from their Elements or Principles.


49 Aristotle's criticism is that Plato's determination of not-being as *heteron* is really 'otherness' as it belongs to a dialectical thinking of beings which distinguishes between being and not-being as the affirmative and negative which is the true and false. Dialectic separates out what is unessential or false in a determination
Platonic and Sophistic dialectics is a matter of the relation each has to the end it serves. The *eide* appear only to disappear either in the service of the individual or the Good. If the *eide* were to be stable, then the dialectical principles of identity and difference, or the One and the Dyad, would have to lose their independence within a context which preserves them in their difference from each other.

Rather than saying that something is unified, Plato regards Unity as a constitutive element or principle which is somehow present along with another element or the dyadic principle. The dyad has two senses: indeterminacy before it is contained within the limits of contrariety, and the indeterminate as it is limited by contraries such as the great and small, many and few, long and short and so forth. In other words the dyad can either be viewed as itself constituted out of contraries or as a contrary which stands opposed to the One or Unity. In either view the dyad denotes precisely what the One is not and cannot be the source of. At a lower level Plato speaks of the highest genera (same-other, motion-rest, and being). The *megista gene* stand in the primary relation of being and not-being. At a further lower level the *eide* are understood in terms of the contraries being and otherness or relative negation. Finally 'the many' are explained in terms of taking and not-taking part in their *eidos* and as sustained in their relativity to the *eide* by the One. Plato hoped to connect the 'indeterminate many' with an absolutely determinate One through the *eide*, but the *eide* do not provide such a bridge, but rather, find the link between their own self-identity and relation to what is other somewhere beyond their own determination.

Plato's criticism of Anaxagoras in the *Phaedo* was that when he tried to explain why something is the way it is, he did not show that it is the way it is because it is best that it be that way. Rather he introduced ancillary causes which did not belong to the operation of intelligence or the Good. Aristotle's criticism of Plato is of a similar nature. In order to explain how there can be plurality or becoming, Plato, according to Aristotle, introduced a principle which is not a principle for thought. Aristotle argues that many of the problems in the Platonic philosophy arise because Plato's negative principle as matter or space or time or the dyadic principle retains the character of a separate principle, indeed in order to come to the definition of the pure *eidos*. From the start all there really is is 'a one' and the dialectical movement is only for a thinking which would return back to 'the one' having shown all the determinations which lead to it to be false pretenders. Aristotle writes: "What sort of being and non-being, then, by their union pluralize the things that are? This thinker [Plato, *Sophist*, 327a] means by the non-being, the union of which with being pluralizes the things that are, the false and the character of falsity. This is also why it used to be said that we must assume something that is false, as geometers assume the line which is not a foot long to be a foot long." [*Metaphysics*, (1089a18-22)]

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52 *Sophist*, 256e-257b.
53 *Sophist*, 258d-260a.
54 See *Phaedo*, 95e ff. and Plato's examination of hypotheses which underlie 'second best method' in *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*.
55 For a very instructive account of the manifold forms Plato gives to his negative principle see Findlay's convincing refutation of Cherniss's arguments on the matter: Findlay, *Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, 463 ff..
an element, which stands opposed to the eidetic side of the One or the ideas, such that how the two sides are connected cannot be grasped by thought but only imagined as a sort of synthesis of hostile elements. Plato, in this account, has failed to allow the negative side to fall apart in its separation from its relation to the eidetic such that the material can be seen as wholly determined by the ideal. Aristotle's criticism that 'participation' is merely a poetical image, understood in this light, is not so external to the intention of the Platonic philosophy as it might at first seem.

What does Plato present as the cause of becoming and plurality? The elements which constitute the object which becomes are taken in Plato's view to be the contraries of being and not-being which differ from Aristotelian elements of matter and form which are not contraries in any ordinary sense, but rather, have the relation of potency to actuality. Matter in Aristotle's view can only be taken separately for a thinking which is external to its object and is properly a principle of thought. Plato's matter and not-being, and indeed, many (Findlay and Aristotle) argue Plato's space and time, are the dyadic principle of indeterminacy which stands opposed to the One as, in his account, being does to not-being or form to matter. Once the problem is given the form of starting with the principles as elements and as contraries and the One as a principle, one is forced to the following conclusion. Being cannot be the cause of becoming since being simply is and is one and not many, at rest and not changing or becoming. Plato therefore regards becoming as a determinate part of not-being, but not not-being taken by itself as having an absolute determination in itself for thought. Not-being qua not-being is nothing in itself. It has no legs of its own to stand on in the relation of opposition to another. But Plato had the problem that if there is to be plurality or becoming, its cause must somehow be found in not-being or matter or space or time or in the indeterminate dyad because once Unity is allowed to be a separate principle what is other than it must be something different from it and even opposed to it as the plurality of the eide is to the oneness of the One or the manyness of 'the many' to their self-identity in their eidos or the negativity of becoming to the positivity of being.

Plato could not achieve the relation he sought: that finite things be caused by the 'Good' as what they desire because he could not show how the Good could be present in some way in 'not-being'. This is in part because he did not conceive of not-being as both what underlies or the context within which change occurs, and steresis, which in its own nature is not-being rather than relative negation. What is other than form, in Aristotle's account, is at once the privation or not-being of the form and the desire for it in matter. What unites matter with its form is the end or the Good. This explanation of becoming answers to the requirement Plato set for himself in the Phaedo: that things must be explained in terms of the operation of Intelligence or the Good and not by the introduction of additional causes. Aristotle is able to say that the eide are effective causes both in their presence and in their absence and he does not require a separate cause of division and change apart from what, in Plato's terms, the eide themselves yield.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{56}\) A.M. Johnston makes the following comment on Physics, 192a6-12: "The results of 'overlooking' hyle and its ability to mediate between opposites are twofold. First there is no connection brought out, in spite of what Plato intends, between what 'is' absolutely, the good, the first principle, and 'becoming'. In other
The Platonic dialectic of *methexis* and *chorismos*, of idea and appearance, of one and the dyad is able to define the *aporiai* as Aristotle recognized in Book Beta of the *Metaphysics*, but it is not able to show how the terms which constitute the *aporiai* are able to be connected in a way that preserves their essential distinctions. Professor Doull writes:

"The impediment which divided the [Platonic] good from creative divine activity Aristotle saw to be the common assumption that everything finite was composed of contraries. No further advance was possible unless what thinking knew as other than itself was comprehensive of contraries."\(^{57}\)

Aristotle, in Professor Doull's account, understood his teacher well and contributed greatly to the further development of Platonism.

The Principle Of Excluded Middle Then And Now: Aristotle
And Principia Mathematica

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There is a very long tradition from the fourth century B.C. to the nineteenth century, in which the logic of Aristotle was studied, commented on, criticized at times, though never dethroned, the logic which dominated western thought until the twentieth century. It is this we call "Aristotelian Logic". That logic regarded as a science is appropriately defined by Kant in these words: "Logic is ... a science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thinking, not, however, in respect of particular objects but all objects in general: it is a science, therefore, of the right use of the understanding and of reason as such, not subjectively, i.e. not according to empirical (psychological) principles of how the understanding thinks, but objectively, i.e. according to *a priori* principles of how it ought to think."¹

In the development of Aristotelian logic, these necessary laws of thought are derived by reference to thought itself as it expresses being and non-being. There are three very general principles² commonly called the Laws (or Principles) of Thought which specify what it is to think of something scientifically: the Principle of Identity, which requires that the object must be thought as having an immutable nature (A is A); the Principle of Contradiction, where it cannot be thought as at once having a certain character and not having that character (A cannot be B and not B); and the Principle of Excluded Middle, where it either has that character or property or does not have it (A is either B or not B). The fuller implications of these three principles will be treated below, where their logic is contrasted with the significance of these principles for modern truth-functional logic.


². A fourth principle, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is added by speculative philosophers such as Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger. But we shall remain silent about it.
Modern logic was given its classical formulation in *Principia Mathematica.* In that work the Principle of Identity (p\(\rightarrow\)p) appears as Th. 2.08, the Law of Contradiction -(p\(-\)p) as Th. 3.24, the Law of Excluded Middle (pv-p) as Th. 2.11. Although these are distinct theorems, the three principles of Aristotelian Logic are clearly only interdefinitions in Classical logic, for

\[(p\rightarrow p) = (pv-p) = -(p\neg p).\]

In short, they collapse into one another. As theorems moreover they themselves become elements of proofs of subsequent theorems.

Aristotle gives these principles distinct interpretations. Of the Principle of Contradiction he says, "A principle which one must have if he is to understand anything is not an hypothesis; and that which one must know if he is to know anything must be in his possession for every occasion. Clearly, then, such a principle is the most certain of all; and what this principle is we proceed to state. It is: 'The same thing cannot at the same time both belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect.'" The Principle of Excluded Middle is not derived from the Principle of Contradiction; it follows rather from the definition of what is truth and falsehood: "What is more, there cannot be anything between two contradictories, but of any one subject, one thing must either be asserted or denied. This is clear if we first define what is truth and what is falsehood. A falsity is a statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it is; and a truth is a statement of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not. Hence, he who states of anything that it is, or that it is not, will either speak truly or speak falsely. But of what is neither being nor nonbeing it is not said that it is or that it is not." How do these two principles differ? One way of expressing the difference, Aristotle's way, is this: the Principle of Contradiction assures that not everything is true; the Principle of Excluded Middle that not everything is false. In his words:

The statement of Heraclitus, that everything is and is not, seems to make everything true, but that of Anaxagoras, that an intermediate exists between two contradictories, makes everything false; for when things are

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3. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Cambridge, 1910. In this century the logic of *Principia Mathematica* [henceforth PM] has so succeeded that it is now called "Classical logic", and so it shall be called here.

4. Russell calls these theorems by these names. He states that the Principle of Identity given there is not the same as the 'law of identity', which is inferred from the Principle later in the work. See *Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 99, 101, 111.


blended, the blend is neither good nor not-good, so that it is not possible to say anything truly.\(^7\)

The Principle of Identity is not derived from either of the others, but from Aristotle's reflections on the unity and being of substance: "To ask why something is itself is to inquire into nothing, for the fact or the existence of something must be clear. Thus, the fact that something is itself, this is the one answer, and the one cause in all cases, as, for example, in the questions `Why is a man a man?' and `Why is the musical musical?', unless one were to answer that each thing is indivisible from itself, since to be one for each thing is to be indivisible from itself. But this [that a thing is itself] is common to all things and a short answer for all of them."\(^8\) The Principle of Identity is not as it might appear the abstract reiteration of a term as subject and predicate. In its propositional form, as Hegel observes, there is promise of a distinction between subject and predicate, as well as identity.\(^9\) A true appreciation of this principle is found in Leibniz, who holds that all truth is identity, but not an empty repetition stripped of difference. The Principle of Identity is rather the assertion of the unity of what is different.

These three principles in the long tradition of Aristotelian logic are distinct from one another, serving as regulative principles of the understanding rather than as rules of inference or elements of proofs. In these two respects they stand opposed to their interpretation in Classical logic. There is another fundamental difference between the two interpretations: Aristotelian logic holds these principles as self-evident.\(^10\) Classical logic regards them as tautological elements of a formal system which itself is at most a theory of ratiocination. This requires elaboration for the sake of the subsequent argument.

The formal system of PM regarded as a `theory' of logic\(^11\) is not to be judged true or false, but more or less adequate to that which it is devised to order and systematize. The elements of the formal system are given `interpretations' which, ideally, make the axioms turn out true in domains of discourse to which the formal system is applied. But as with theorems in general, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, in the deductions made from the theory and their agreement with experience, in the case of PM in the theorems

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\(^7\) Ibid., 1012a25-29.

\(^8\) Ibid. VII, 1041a15-20

\(^9\) Encyclopedia Logic, n.115.

\(^10\) Aristotle states emphatically, for example, that though the Principle of Contradiction is the most certain of all, it cannot be demonstrated. But the position of one who says that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be [to deny then the Principle of Contradiction] can be refuted "if only our opponent says something." Aristotle produces, in Metaphy. IV, ch.4 (1006a29 - 1009a5) at least seven "demonstrations by refutation", as he calls them, to show that he who denies the Principle of Contradiction must assume it to effect his denial.

\(^11\) This position was early expressed by Ernst Nagel in "Logic without Ontology", in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. J.H.Krikorian, New York, 1944.
deducible from the axioms and their applicability to logical interests. The three principles in question as formulated in the Formal System PM are simply valid-within-the-system. We shall see that the Principle of Excluded Middle as formulated in Th. 2.11 of PM, (pv-p), presents difficulties when interpreted as a logical principle with absolute validity.

A. Difficulties With The Principle Of Excluded Middle Of Classical Logic, (Pv-P)

There are deviations from Classical logic for various reasons, some relatively innocuous, others so fundamental they amount, in Quine's expression, to "changing the subject." Among the innocuous `deviant logics' are many-valued logics, where propositions are not simply divided into 'true' and 'false', but, say, 'true', 'false' and 'possible'. Such logics obviously deny the Principle of Excluded Middle, (pv-p), of Classical logic, but still use the two-valued logic as their paradigm. In Intuitionist logic there occurs a fundamental deviation.

Let us recall the history of the birth of Classical logic, and the reasons for the Intuitionist deviation from it. With the production of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth century, there was a perceived crisis in the foundations of mathematics. The consistency of rival geometries showed that axioms and postulates were not self-evident truths, but were themselves to be judged within axiom systems for consistency, completeness, independence, but not for truth. Mathematics then required a more rigorous foundation than simple conformity to our intuitions of counting and measuring. Moreover, there was great interest in the counter-intuitional results of Cantor concerning the comparison and ordering of infinite collections, the hierarchy from those that are countable (as the natural numbers) to those that are uncountable (the real numbers). In his development of abstract set theory, Cantor produced the ascending series of transfinite cardinals, results which were as exciting as they were mind-bending. But just as his work was winning general acceptance, contradictions and paradoxes began to appear: the Burali-Forti paradox in 1897, Russell's paradox (concerning the set of all sets that are not members of themselves), and Cantor's own paradox in 1899. There was pressing need, therefore, to secure mathematics on a firm foundation.

Mathematicians of the latter part of the century set about to secure these foundations in two ways: (1) to derive mathematics from a logical system itself more fundamental than mathematics [Frege in his Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze, Russell in PM, the `logicists'
in short]; (2) to formulate mathematics as a formal axiomatic system, and prove the system consistent, that is, free from contradiction by finitist methods\textsuperscript{14} [Hilbert and his followers, the `formalists' in short]. Both programs failed, the logicist program because of the discovery of the `antinomies' resulting from self-referentiality\textsuperscript{15}, the formalist program because of Godel's incompleteness proofs.\textsuperscript{16}

`Intuitionism' rose out of the ashes of the destructive effect of the `antinomies', and found new impetus in the results of Godel. Brouwer, its early twentieth century leader, maintained that the need for a Fregean logical foundation or rigorous axiomatization only appeared because mathematics had extended itself beyond its limits. In a paper "The untrustworthiness of the principles of logic" (1908), he criticized the unexamined use of the laws of Classical logic, in particular the Law of Excluded Middle, \((p \lor \neg p)\). According it absolute validity in cases extending to all natural numbers, for example, leads to results unacceptable to Intuitionists. For consider, say, the proposition \(p\): "There is an uninterrupted run of 1000 nines in the decimal expansion of \(B\)." Such a proposition is virtually undecidable, for though one might very improbably find such a run and hence affirm the proposition as true, there is no way to prove the proposition false, the infinite sequence of digits not being exhaustible. The intuitionist rejects the application of \((p \lor \neg p)\) where infinite sequences or an infinite set is in question. Thus, for him the principle does not have universal validity.

Of course the intuitionist rejection of the principle \((p \lor \neg p)\) cannot be done without discarding other elements of the logic of PM, \((p \rightarrow p)\), \((\neg p \rightarrow \neg \neg p)\) [given their equivalence to \((p \lor \neg p)\)], and also one half of the law of double negation, \((p = \neg \neg p)\).\textsuperscript{17} Rejecting \((p \lor \neg p)\),

\textsuperscript{14} That is, procedures that do not involve the conception of the completed infinite.

\textsuperscript{15} There are, of course, the various devices (such as Russell's `theory of logical types') for avoiding the production of the known antinomies without forsaking general set theory. But these are stop-gap measures. As Quine [The Ways of Paradox, Cambridge, Mass., 1976, 16] aptly observes: "We cannot simply withhold each antinomy-producing membership condition and assume classes corresponding to the rest. The trouble is that there are membership conditions corresponding to each of which, by itself, we can innocuously assume a class, and yet these classes together can yield a contradiction. ... I remarked earlier that the discovery of antimony is a crisis in the evolution of thought. In general set theory the crisis began sixty years ago [written in 1961] and is not yet over." Nor is it over today.

\textsuperscript{16} What Godel proved in 1931 was that no deductive system, whatever its axioms, is able theoretically to prove all the truths of elementary number theory. He did this by constructing a sentence in elementary number theory which is true if and only if it is not a theorem of number theory, the complete analogue, in layman's terms, of "I am unprovable." As Stephen Kleene explains, "Godel's sentence 'I am unprovable' is not paradoxical. We escape paradox because (whatever Hilbert may have hoped) there is no a priori reason why every true sentence must be provable." [ "The Work of Kurt Godel", The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41 (1976), in S.G. Shanker ed, Godel's Theorem in Focus, London, 1988, 54.] Godel showed that any number-theoretic formal system, consisting of a logic to which is added number-theoretic axioms, is incomplete if it is consistent. The logical part, the formal system PM, has been proven complete. Thus, the number-theoretic axioms must ever be incomplete, and with this result Hilbert's program is demolished.

\textsuperscript{17} Intuitionists must reject \(\neg \neg p \rightarrow p\) (hence \(p = \neg \neg p\)), for if \(p = \neg \neg p\), then \(\neg \neg p \rightarrow p\) immediately reduces to \(p \rightarrow p\) (i.e. to \(p \lor \neg p\)).
intuitionist logic must also reject *reductio ad absurdum*, which relies in one of its steps on \((p\lor \neg p)\).\(^{18}\) The logic that remains lacks the simplicity, convenience and familiarity of the logic of PM, and the arsenal of tools familiar to the mathematician (*reductio ad absurdum* and mathematical induction among them) is considerably reduced. The system that is produced can be construed as a fragment of the logic of PM, having PM as its only complete enlargement.\(^{19}\) Obscured perhaps in the logic which is left is the intuitionist's demand for constructive proofs for mathematical objects -- he is intolerant of arguments which purport to produce mathematical objects simply by showing the falsity of the assumption of the non-existence of such objects. For most mathematicians the price the intuitionist would exact is too high, even as they grant the cogency of his reasons, and themselves recognize a constructive proof as sounder than that which has been demonstrated non-constructively.

Although Brouwer's `intuitionism' antedates Godel's incompleteness theorems, the position was strengthened by Godel's results which demonstrated that there are formally undecidable propositions of PM and related systems. In Godel's own words, "...it can be proven rigorously that in every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of finitary number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic propositions and that, moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be proved in the system."\(^{20}\) Quine, notwithstanding his complete loyalty to Classical logic, is moved to say, "The excess of admitted questions over possible answers seems especially regrettable when the questions are mathematical and the answers mathematically impossible."\(^{21}\)

If there is dispute about the propriety or justification of a logical principle such as \((p\lor \neg p)\), how might one settle the dispute? Intuitionists reject the principle in question, whereas present-day mathematicians, who tend to describe themselves as Platonists or realists,\(^{22}\) accept the principle, though sometimes with reservations:

There are also differences of viewpoint concerning the lengths to which one may be prepared to carry one's Platonism - if, indeed one claims to be a Platonist. ...When all the ramifications of set theory are considered, one comes across sets which are so wildly enormous and nebulously constructed that even a fairly determined Platonist such as myself may

\(^{18}\) A *reductio ad absurdum* proof of, say, \(t\) runs this way: assume \(-t\). Derive a contradiction \(q\lor \neg q\). Then \(-t > (q\lor \neg q)\), which is absurd. Thus, because \(tv\lor t\), then \(t\).

\(^{19}\) As A. Tarski proved. Cf. Kneale and Kneale, 574. But to construe it as a `fragment of PM' is to misconstrue it, for intuitionist logic intends its results to be radically different from PM.


\(^{21}\) *Philosophy of Logic*, 87.

\(^{22}\) `Realists' because they hold that mathematical conjectures are true or false prior to and independent of the proofs whereby they are established; thus they cannot go so far as intuitionists in rejecting some form of `either \(p\) or not \(p\)'.
begin to have doubts about their existence ... There may come a stage at which the sets have such convoluted and conceptually dubious definitions that the question of the truth or falsity of mathematical statements concerning them may begin to take on a somewhat `matter-of-opinion' quality rather than a `God-given' one.\textsuperscript{23}

Mathematicians of various stripes have difficulties, it would seem, with the principle pv-pp. If they will not go so far as the intuitionists in a radical solution to these difficulties, they must nonetheless find them annoying and, as Quine might put it, `regrettable'.

\section*{B. The Principle Of Excluded Middle In Aristotelian Logic}

There is confusion about Aristotle's understanding of the Principle of Excluded Middle originating, we shall argue, in an inadequacy of Classical logic -- it is a blunt instrument -- to express the Aristotelian position. The chief criticism of the Aristotelian account and confusion about it centre on Aristotle's reservations about the principle applied to future contingents in \textit{De Interpretatione}, ch.9. An analysis of the argument there and in ch. 7 of that work will show Aristotle's account is clear and unambiguous, and at the same time reveal what is inadequate if the argument is approached under the paradigm of Classical logic.

Aristotle begins \textit{De.Interp.}, ch. 9, with a statement of what is called the Principle of Bivalence,\textsuperscript{24} although here limited to what is or what has taken place: "With regard to things present or past propositions whether positive or negative are true of necessity or false." [18a28-9] As shown in Aristotle's account of `opposition', affirmative/negative universal propositions are opposed as contradictories to negative/affirmative particular propositions, and there one contradictory must be true and the other false.\textsuperscript{25} But two universal propositions, one affirmative and the other negative are opposed as contraries; it is impossible that both propositions are true, though both might be false.\textsuperscript{26} Aristotle is at pains here to distinguish two sorts of negations: any universal proposition can be the

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{23} Roger Penrose, \textit{The Emperor's New Mind}, Oxford, 1989, 113.
    \item \textsuperscript{24} Jan Łukasiewicz, \textit{Aristotle's Syllogistic}, Oxford, 1951, 82: "...the so-called principle of bivalence which state that every proposition is either true or false, i.e. that it has one and only one of two possible truth values: truth and falsity." He continues: "This principle must not be mixed up with the law of excluded middle, according to which of two contradictory propositions one must be true."
    \item \textsuperscript{25} As "Every man is white" and "Not every man is white" ["Some man is not white."]
    \item \textsuperscript{26} As "Every man is white" and "No man is white", ch.7, 17b16-22. Subcontrariety is not an `opposition' in Aristotle's sense: "The particular affirmative and particular negative do not have opposition properly speaking, because opposition is concerned with the same subject." St. Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan, \textit{Comm. On Interpretation}, trans. Jean T. Oesterle, Milwaukee, 1962, 90. The subjects of particular propositions having the same subject term are indeterminate for any singular thing, thus may or may not intersect.
\end{itemize}
negation of another as its *contrary* (All S is P; All S is nonP), and here they can be false at the same time; or as its *contradictory* (All S is P; Some S is nonP), and here one must be true and the other false. Therefore, "Of two opposites it is not the case always that one must be true and the other false." In Classical logic there is only the one form of opposition, propositional negation. This marks a fundamental difference between the two logics. The Classical logician, blind to contrariety, interprets what he reads in Aristotle solely (and therefore inadequately) as propositional negation.

"Socrates is not white", an example of a singular proposition, is the proper negation of "Socrates is white", and here too, as with contradictory propositions, one must be true and the other false because such propositions regarding things present (or past) are determinate. But not so with opposed singular propositions about future contingent matters. It is this case which is the subject matter of Ch. 9, and the question is whether in singular propositions about future contingencies, propositions such as "There will be a sea battle tomorrow", "There won't be a sea battle tomorrow", it is necessary that one of the opposites be true and the other false.

The problem is set in a metaphysical context of contingency and necessity. Does the analysis of truth and falsity in propositions and being and non-being in things actual and past imply a fatalistic necessity of being and non-being in future things? If what has been said should suggest that *per impossible* all events come about of necessity, then we must subject the Principle of Excluded Middle to further scrutiny. The Philosopher's gaze will be directed toward singular propositions concerning that which may or may not come to pass in the future. But why singular propositions, such as `Socrates will be executed tomorrow', and not universal propositions, `All living things will die' for example? Singular propositions pertaining to what will or will not be can, some of them at least, be said to be contingent, whereas universal propositions as universal have their predicates necessarily in their subjects, are "big with the future" as one might say, as death is there given in the being of the living thing. Why again only propositions about the future? What is different about that which is past or present? There is nothing of contingency in what has been, nor in what is actual. The actual as actual is beyond the contingency of what may or may not be - it is realized possibility.

Aristotle states the dimensions of the problem in this way:

For if every affirmation or negation is true or false [Principle of Excluded Middle] it is necessary for everything either to be the case or not to be the case. For if one person says that something will be and another denies this

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27 See Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language*. Oxford, 1982, viii, Chaps. 13 and 14, and Appendix B. Sommers' book was largely inspired by the difference between these two forms of opposition and the one form in Classical logic.

28 Aquinas says, "...those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to singulars, whereas those that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to singulars according to the notions of their universals." *Comm. on Interp.*, 104. Thus `Socrates will die' is determinately true, having nothing of contingency in it even though of the future.
same thing, it is clearly necessary for one of them to be saying what is true -- if every affirmative is true or false [Principle of Bivalence]; for both will not be the case together under such circumstances. ... it follows that nothing is or is happening, or will be or will not be, by chance or as chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since either he who says or he who denies is saying what is true.)

The argument of Chap. 9 shows that what follows from the assumption that one of opposites must be true and the other false is untenable because impossible. Then (at 19a23) Aristotle proceeds most directly to express the distinctions required to state the truth of the matter.

There are different grades of contingency that are threatened if opposed propositions about future singular things must be one true and one false, and a different analysis is appropriate to each of them. As long as something will be in the future, it will be there in one way or another in its cause, determinately in some cases and therefore necessarily ("Socrates will die"), as an inclination in other cases but such that the cause could be impeded ("Socrates will be executed tomorrow"), lastly as a potency purely ("The cat will catch the mouse.") For our purposes the second and third cases yield different and perhaps unexpected results.

When two opposed propositions speak of future contingencies, as in Aristotle's example "There will be a sea-battle tomorrow", "There won't be a sea-battle tomorrow", even if there is a strong inclination toward the former -- the ships on both sides assembled, the conflict between the warring parties extreme, the weather propitious, Aristotle insists that we must reject the conclusion that either he who says there will be such a battle speaks truly or he who says there won't be speaks truly. There is nothing determinate to make one or other of those pronouncements true. But if neither proposition is true, then this proposition is also not true (given that it says one of the disjuncts is true):

\[(1) \text{`Either the sea-battle will take place tomorrow or the sea-battle won't'}. \]

Because it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, what is true is necessarily true when it is true, but not before it is true. But, adds


30 Aquinas, Comm. on Interp., 107.

31 Cf. 18a35 - b8 for the reductio ad impossibile of the position.

32 A proper symbolization of this proposition would not be the disjunction (p v \neg p) of Classical logic, but \`a is P or a is not-P'. See Sommers, 308-9.

33 "What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not." 19a23, Ackrill, 52.
Aristotle, "it is not possible to say neither is true; that is, to say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place." (18b17) Thus, this proposition is not acceptable:

(2) `The sea-battle neither will take place nor will not take place.'

That proposition also illicitly says something determinate -- it asserts that both disjuncts are false.

Is there a proper assertion falling under the Principle of Excluded Middle in this case? Clearly (pv-p) won't do, for it asserts the truth of one of the disjuncts and would thus fall under the same objections as (1). One could say, with Aristotle:

Clearly then it is not necessary that of every affirmative and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be; with these it is as we have said. (19a39)  

and that is as explicit a denial of the Principle of Excluded Middle, at least as given in Classical logic, as one could find. Furthermore, it should be clear that Aristotle is here denying the truth or falsity of

(3) The sea-battle will take place tomorrow.

(4) The sea-battle won't take place tomorrow.

Thus, in the argument of Chap. 9, it must be said that propositions are not always true or false, a denial of the universal applicability of the Principle of Bivalence.

It is therefore not a little strange to read Kneale's analysis of Chap. 9: he says that what Aristotle is apparently doing is questioning the Principle of Bivalence while accepting the Principle of Excluded Middle. Interpolating Aristotle's words, Kneale concludes:

For while he asserts that `everything must either be or not be, or about to be or not be [19a27-30], he also says `It is not necessary that of every affirmation and denial of opposed statements one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially but not actually the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good.' [19a39-b4]. This appears to mean that the disjunction of a statement

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34 There are other assertions of some apparent form of Excluded Middle, at 19a30 for example: "I mean, for example, it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for the sea battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place..." Ackrill, 53. Sommers, 308-9, suggests what he calls a categorial principle, `A sea-battle will-or-won't take place tomorrow." This has the merit of expressing the potentiality of the situation today appropriately, and at the same time one is not led to the conclusion rejected most forcefully by Aristotle that one or other disjunct is actually true.
and its negation can be true without either the original statement of its
negation being true. In other words, Aristotle is trying to assert the Law of
Excluded Middle while denying the Principle of Bivalence. We have
already seen this is a mistake.\footnote{35}

The Principle of Excluded Middle that Kneale thinks Aristotle is asserting is the
notorious (pv-p) of Classical logic. But Aristotle is questioning both Bivalence and
Excluded Middle as the argument above has shown, though neither in the form (pv-p), to
which Kneale reduces both in his argument. In trying to understand these passages
Kneale is an unwitting slave to an inappropriate principle. His "solution" (that Aristotle
should recognize that the sentence \`There will be a sea-battle tomorrow' expresses the
same proposition as the sentence \`There is a sea-battle' uttered tomorrow) shows that he
interprets each from the simplistic principle (pv-p) of Classical logic, a principle
completely inadequate to the discussion, and missing Aristotle's difficulties entirely.
Kneale's so-called "solution" is Aristotle's problem: if today a proposition about
tomorrow's contingency is true, how can this be without falling into the untoward
consequences Aristotle has put before us. Storrs McCall offers a 'proof' similar to
Kneale's which begins: "What Aristotle seems not to have noticed is that the two
doctrines, that \`p' is true if and only if p, and that some propositions are neither true nor
false are incompatible."\footnote{36} But Tarski's criterion of truth, " p is true if and only if p",
differs radically from Aristotle's "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is,
is false; while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true."
\[Metaphy.1110b26-28\] Tarski's criterion is sentential (p is a sentence), \`Platonist' in
intention (sentences are true and false apart from any "saying" of them), and properly
applied as Tarski himself shows in formal, not natural language. Aristotle's definition is
appropriate to the categorical proposition (Saying of all or some S that is P that it is P),
with safeguards against the radical Platonist/realist implications of Tarski's definition,
and properly applied in natural language.

Peter Geach gives a completely bogus reading of Aristotle's statement "It is not
possible to say neither is true; that is to say, that a thing neither will take place nor will
not take place," (the passage analyzed above). In a series of steps acceptable only to
Classical logic, he reduces \`Not: neither F nor not-F' to \`Not:not:either F or not-F', then
by Double Negation to \`Either F or not-F' -- the Classical Law of Excluded Middle. He
writes:

\begin{quote}
People have tried to maintain (sometimes appealing to three-valued logic)
that of a pair of contradictory predictions relating to a future continency
neither need be true. (Sometimes they say that neither need be
determinately true; but this qualification, though it may make their
doctrine easier to swallow, is quite devoid of sense.) Oddly enough, they
claim as precedent the famous chapter ix of Aristotle's \textit{De Interpretatione}.
\end{quote}

\footnote{35} Kneale and Kneale, 48, underlining mine.

\footnote{36} McCall in "A Non-Classical Theory of Truth", \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly}, Vol. 7 (1979), 83-86.
In fact, Aristotle expressly rejects the idea of such a breakdown of our Law (op. cit. 18b,18-20). Moreover, he supplies a strong argument against the idea. What is now true to say that a thing will be, it will be true to say that it is or has been; so, if it is now true to say of Jones that he is neither going to be hanged tomorrow nor not, then tomorrow it will be true to say of him that he neither has been hanged nor has not; and this sort of result, Aristotle says, is absurd (op. cit. 18b,22-25).\(^{37}\)

As the argument above shows, Aristotle in that passage stands against asserting any indeterminate proposition as true. Far from "expressly rejecting the breakdown of our Law", he is not accepting a Principle of Excluded Middle in any of its guises when it purports to determine the indeterminate. One could hardly have read Aristotle in a more bizarre manner.\(^{38}\)

To complete our analysis of Chap.9, there is still the case to be considered where a future contingent is in its cause as a bare potency. Aristotle gives this example: "Thus, this coat may be cut in two halves; yet it may not be cut in two halves. It may wear out before it is cut." If it should happen that the coat is destroyed this day by fire, then the two propositions `This coat will be cut in half' and `This coat will not be cut in half' are both false, there being no coat. As Aristotle explains in *Categories* x

The statement that `Socrates is ill' is the contrary of `Socrates is well'. Yet we cannot maintain even here that one statement must always be true and the other must always be false. For, if Socrates really exists, one is true and the other false. But if Socrates does not exist, both the one and the other are false.\(^{39}\)

Where the subject of a proposition is vacuous, then it and its negation are related as contraries, there being only the opposition of the predicate, not contradictories, and both propositions are false. This would obtain for all propositions with vacuous `definite descriptions', for example the hackneyed `The present king of France is bald.' Sommers would extend this analysis also to propositions where predication is a category mistake.

The reservations Aristotle has and distinctions he makes about his own Principle of Excluded Middle (and Bivalence) are grounded in his metaphysics. We have grown accustomed to another logic and narrower metaphysics; and so we must stretch our understanding to be equal to these profound arguments. For Aristotle logical propositions are related to truth and falsity as things to being and non-being. When things are

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38 Sommers, 310, says, "Not one of the distinctions needed for an understanding of chapter 9 is available to the interpreter who comes to it with a Fregean organon."

indeterminate either because they are not actual or not completely given in their causes, propositions about them must be similarly indefinite. This is ever the case in things that neither always are (necessary being) nor always are not (impossibilities), but sometimes are and sometimes are not. There are, no doubt, eternal truths in the temporal world, but not all truths are eternal. And so it is not necessary that of every affirmation and its negation, one must be true and the other false.

C. Concluding Reflections On Interpreting Philosophy

Classical logic has been described as a "blunt instrument" in dissecting Aristotle's argument: the subtleties required are just not available to it. There is something likewise less than satisfactory about the application of Classical logic to mathematics, a certain uniformity and bluntness there too which the Intuitionist rejects. There are other cases not mentioned in this paper, where the generic character of Classical logic, its homogenous 'one-size-fits-all' approach becomes intolerable. Heisenberg's `uncertainty principle', fundamental to the structure of quantum mechanics, cannot be accommodated to Classical logic; nor, it should be added, could Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, to mention only some from the history of modern philosophy.

Classical logic, with its Principles of Double Negation and Excluded Middle, is not without its metaphysics, changing, developing, evolving, from its earliest statements in Frege and Russell, expressed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, through the analytical philosophies that give priority to language, to more recent analysts who give priority to the structure of thought expressed in language. What do these philosophies which take Classical logic for granted have in common, and what, if anything, do those other philosophical positions share in their common opposition to the prevailing logic? Except for obvious differences which grow out of matters we have addressed, these questions are beyond the scope of this paper.

It is clear that those who subscribe to the Classical position on Bivalence and Excluded Middle, do express some form of 'realism' [Dummett's characterization]: there is for them a "world" which is what it is whether we know it or not; and true propositions are simply those that express what is the case with the world. The world might be completely unknown, many of its "truths" unknowable in principle, as the mathematical 'realists' (or 'Platonists' as they prefer to call themselves) would grant; nonetheless "truths" about the "world" would subsist, "absolute, external and eternal." How have we come to this again as a viable philosophical position, after the whole history of modern philosophy which

40 These questions are addressed in Michael Dummett's book, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge MA, 1990. He calls the two groups 'realists' and 'anti-realists'. 'Realists', he says, share a common doctrine, which cannot be said of the 'anti-realists'. What unites them in their opposition to the 'realists' is simply their rejection of the Principle of Bivalence.

41 In the words of Penrose about mathematics, op.cit., 113.
stands opposed to it? From the Cartesian *cogito*, to the subjective idealism of Berkeley and Hume, to the `Copernican Revolution' of Kant, we have long known the `egocentric predicament' of attempting to assert the purported existence of a world apart from a known world.

To trace the history of this (largely) twentieth century `realism' would be long, and out of place here. Whatever its origin, in Frege's rejection of what he calls "psychologism" or elsewhere, this much can be said, that the logic which he invented was so radical and so remarkably compelling and productive that it effected its own revolution. Frege succeeded in reducing all of classical mathematics to a single formal system. But that would have had only esoteric interest. His revolution in logic lies in his doctrine that singular sentences are atoms, and more complex propositions are simply truth-functions of these atoms. Once a mechanical calculus of truth-functions was provided, then Classical logic became an extraordinarily powerful technique for manipulating these atoms, ordering them in ways that serve the prevailing interest in the logic of contingencies, the concatenation of `facts' for practical and theoretical purposes. After Russell made it popular, Classical logic applied its calculus to ever widening fields, to switching circuits (in 1930), to scientific discourse (from the late 20's), to the computer (the Turing machine, its theoretical model, in 1937), to every form of academic interest claiming to be science, and to every sort of technological interest. In its wonderful simplicity, power and decidability it is said to have advanced in a very short time beyond everything achieved in logic in its previous 2000 year history. In this case, it is the logic which carries the metaphysics with it: the `realism' of our times is consequent on the unquestioned success and authority of Classical logic.

If anything else is to be gleaned from the matters analyzed here, perhaps it is this, that Classical logic is a particularly inept instrument to analyze those philosophies which stand opposed to the `realism' it demands. Yet we see such analyses everywhere in philosophical literature, presented as though they were objective assessments of positions they can at best dogmatically oppose.

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Time As A Psalm In St. Augustine

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Augustine follows a Platonic method in his treatment of time in Confessions XI. The 'in principio' of Genesis is the theme of the book and introduces the problem of the relation of time to the divine in a most direct way. The argument then centres on the problem that the present has no extension: "praesens autem nullum habet spatium" (XI, 15). The problem having been solved Augustine concludes that God's knowledge of time is far more wondrous and secret than that gained through these arguments but that we know better now what an eternal knowing of time might mean (XI, 31). In the Enneads (III, 7, 1) Plotinus outlines his approach: look to eternity, seeking the paradigm for time, but if one looks directly to time, through recollection one will be reminded of the world there, that is, of the nature of the eternal. And it will be clear from both approaches in what sense time is an image of eternity. In Augustine's text then we have these Platonic moments and in a wonderfully mature form.

But of course we have something more. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth"; this is not a general introduction to the notion of eternity but rather a specific revelation in Augustine's view of the creation of the world by God and of the beginning of the historical revelation of that God. The scripture enables the argument to

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begin from the side of the eternal and it enables the argument to assume in a direct way that time and eternity are. But as the beginning of the Christian revelation, it assumes a relation between the two which is not part of the Platonic argument. The difference is perhaps best put in the terms which introduce the book: "Your Father knoweth what you have need of before you ask" and "by the love of your love I do this" (XI, 1). The whole of the first chapter is a paradoxical assertion that God is totally beyond the temporal narrative realm and yet totally present, knowing and active in it. The question which leads to the treatment of time, "What did God do before he made heaven and earth?" (XI, 12) is ironic for as Augustine shows it is a mistaken question, and yet it is a 'high' [alta] one for it assumes that a clarity about the activity of the principle can be attained. "Your today is eternity" and "your years shall not fail" (XI, 12); these temporal terms are positive expressions of God's activity in Chap. 13 even though the point of the chapter is to mark off the treatment of eternity from that of time in Chap. 14.

So without having settled the sense of paradox in relation to this creator God Augustine goes through a careful examination of what is so ordinary as to be almost impossibly difficult (XI, 14). The argument concerning time really turns on the notion of the present and especially that it is without extension [spatium]. The argument is relentless in its pursuit of the contradiction that time must be continuous and extended, for inherent in it is the sense of the long and the short, of measure, of number, while at the same time only that truly is which is present and without any extension.\(^3\)

Augustine follows the thought of the Neoplatonists that this contradiction in time can be most properly held together in the soul. In Chap. 21 he takes the past, present and future from an assumed externality, as extensions, to a single present. But now a present of things past, a present of things present and a present of things to come. There are these three times. The assertion that they are all in some sense present is the assertion that the Aristotelean contradiction between the continuous and the discrete will be overcome in some sense in the discrete - the all at once, the simul, the now.\(^4\) But a now which has three aspects and the measuring is the comparing and coming to some ratio within these aspects. But the subject of this measurement is, still, only an assertion. For the subject we have reached, the present, cannot be measured: "nullum spatium non metimur" (XI,21).

This is the enigma which begins chapter 22 and which causes Augustine to call on the name of Christ for enlightenment. "For this is my hope to contemplate the delight of the Lord". "Behold thou hast made my days old and they pass away, and I know not how." Four Psalms bring out the pain of the search and the faith of the searcher. Why is this chapter of prayer and Psalms placed here in the argument? I have referred to the Platonic

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\(^3\) This opposition is central to the argument and not empirical simply. See the treatment of H.M. Lacey, "Empiricism and Augustine's Problems about time" in Augustine, ed. R.A. Markus, (Anchor, New York, 1972), pp. 280-308; and of Christopher Kirwin, Augustine, Routledge, London, 1989, who argues that Augustine is mistaken here. Augustine intends to unite the senses of existence, present and absolute, which Lacy divides.

character of the argument. Here is a chapter the Platonists would only partially understand. It comes at a time when the discrete and indivisible present must contain the continuous and drawn-out extensions of the past and future. Augustine is seeking such a present and suggests here that it is by scripture that he may find it - or at least he is suggesting that it is by scripture that he is able to seek it.

How does he seek it? He considers the proposal that time is the motion of the sun and moon and stars (XI, 23). But even in the consideration of it, while we speak, is not our speaking in time, so is there not a time prior to these motions? (XI, 23). And at the prayer of a certain man the sun stopped. There is then that which is present which is prior to the presence of motion in the heavens. Neither is time the motion of a body in general (XI, 24) for the comparisons of extensions must be inward rather than external. For two motions must be compared, or motion compared to a length of rest and this comparison depends upon that which is common to both. This leads to another invocation in Chap. 25 and the search in Chap. 26 for the object measured. Do we measure motion or also the time of motion? Speech again becomes the best image for the discussion - how we measure feet and syllables. "Vox corporis incipit sonare" (XI, 27), he begins with the voice sounding. The problem is to make it present and yet measurable. While it is sounding, passing from future to past? But where is the extension? Augustine is seeking an object of measurement which is one with the measurer. The contradiction between the indivisible present and the continuity of time is not to be resolved even by the infinite circular motions of the heavens.⁶

Augustine is stressing the voice so much in these chapters because it is the best approach to be made to the contradiction which grounds the temporal contradiction: that there is a distinction between the unified attention of the soul and the change and diversity which it considers. "Therefore neither future, nor present nor past, nor passing times do we measure, and yet we measure times" (XI, 27). There is no way to measure times but we do it, and then Augustine quotes from Ambrose "Deus creator omnium" (remembered also at the death of Augustine's mother in Bk. IX, 12). It is clear that this is an example to be used in the discussion. It is clear also that it is yet another invocation at this most difficult point in the argument. Augustine wishes to know what he is doing when he says the words but at the same time he wishes to know the God which is the subject matter of the words and his creation in principio. The verse and the argument lead to a consideration of what is truly present. Augustine measures "something in [his] memory" which remains (XI, 27). "In you, my soul, I measure times" he concludes from

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⁵ The problems of the relation between Platonism and theurgy lie beyond the author and the scope of this paper. That speech itself becomes an important and questionable image for Plato and for the NeoPlatonists is clear. See for instance John Dillon, The Golden Chain, Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity, Variorum, 1990, p. 73 ff. Also see Frederic Schroeder: "Speech as declaration is located, not only in ourselves, but in the cosmos of which we speak." Form and Transformation, A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992, pp. 72-73. That theurgy has the unity of the two directions, from divine to human and from human to divine, which I find here in the psalm is well brought out by W.J. Hankey, "Augustinian Immediacy and Dionysian Mediation in John Colet, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker and the Cardinal de Bérulle," Acts of the Kolloquium Augustinus in der Neuzeit, Von Petrarca zum 18. Jahrhundert, Wolfenbüttel, 1996 (forthcoming), p. 5.

⁶ Aristotle's solution, Physics VIII.
this argument. In the memory there is an object of measurement which although extended is all at once for the indivisible present. In the activities of the soul itself there is that which is a fitting object for the soul's measuring.  

Time then is the result of three activities of the mind: "nam et expectat et adtendit et meminit" (XI, 28). Time is the measuring by the soul of its expectation, its attention and its memory. But this still seems externally asserted. We observe these activities in the soul and the observation and Augustine's thoughts upon them have shown that the problem of time is the problem of the unity of the soul's activities. But the unity is still implicit. "I am about to say a song that I know" (IX, 28). In the memory there is a completed whole which I will sing. Before I sing, my expectation has the whole of it. As I sing, the relation of expectation to memory changes. Until the whole is past. How are the three activities brought together in this example? One could answer "by the expectation". Or "by the singing". Or "by the memory". But the best answer is the song. Time is the relation of the parts and the whole in a song, and it is this relation of part and whole which causes the seeming contradiction between measurable time and the present now. This seems to be an even more external way to unify time than the motions of the spheres. But Augustine argues that, just as in the song, so too in the whole life of a man where the singing is his actions; and so through the ages of the sons of man where the singing is their lives.

So the song is the song of God in time and it is the relation of part and whole in all time, in the creation in principio which is the subject of Book XI. From the knowledge of the eternal God we have sought to know how He relates to the temporal. From the temporal itself and from its seeming contradictions we have come to see time as an aspect of the activity of soul and that activity to be an image of the whole activity of God in creation.  

Chap. 29 contrasts especially through Psalm 31 the contemplation of the eternal delights of God, neither to come nor to pass away. "But our years are mourning, we are torn until fused with God: "donec in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui." (XI, 29).

We have understood something of time and the relation it implies but we are still caught between time and eternity. And Chap. 30 brings out that our understanding is, just as our temporal existence, to be absolutely contrasted with the divine. As I know a song, so too does God know time but not with the variety and distention; it is rather that we know God as the creator of mind and, through that, as the "in principio", takes on the content of the timeless creation of heaven and earth. But this negative conclusion the

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7 Jean Guitton expresses this step toward an object of thought in the present as an "énergie spirituelle"; the instance is not an abstract limit but "un acte de l'esprit". Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et Saint-Augustin, Aubier, Paris, 1956, p. 187.

8 "Time must have a foundation which is permanent," John F. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948, p. 178. He stresses that time belongs to soul in a much more fundamental way for Augustine than for Plotinus. One way to understand this is the difference grace makes. Speaking of the presence of the "forgiving God" Jaroslav Pelikan argues "In that presence [confession] could become a way of coming to terms with the continuity of the self by including divine forgiveness within the continuity, and thus of putting the subjectivity of memory into the subjective-objective context of time." The Mystery of Continuity, University Press of Virginia, 1986, p. 26.
Platonists knew well. What is distinct here is the sense which ends this book and which
can be fundamental for the next, that "the humble of hear are your domicile" (XI, 31). In
the soul is a positive image of the activity of God and the unity with that activity is
seen to be possible here. But more, in the Confessions that unity is being brought about.
At certain points within the argument, and here at the end, Augustine is singing songs
that he knows, the psalms. As is brought out in the City of God (especially the treatment
of the 89th Psalm in Book XVII) and in his commentaries, the psalms are songs to be sung. And they are to be sung because they are revealed. They are extended revelations of the "song of the lord"; that is, they are revelations about time. Here Augustine is using the psalms as inspiration and exhortation. The song we sing when we sing these psalms at the end of Book XI is not merely an adequate image according to our argument for the eternal "song" in God's creation. The psalms express that positive relation which the divine has to the soul, the true fullness of the present on which the certainty that time is a whole, of which this moment now is a part, depends. When Augustine quotes the psalms here the object of knowledge, what is referred to through the song, and the measure and thought of it have become one. We understand time through the image of the song and we are fully present in time through the revelation which it is. Time is a psalm as at this moment in the Confessions it is the calling to our true expectation. It is a first form in which, through Scripture, knowledge and its object are one, the final form of which will be the knowledge of the Trinity here implicit in the knowledge of the soul but explicit in Book XIII, where finally the contemplation of God through Genesis will be one with the contemplation of God through the confession of this individual life.

"You have begun to make us free" (XI, 1). Book XI is a consideration of this same act but as creation in principio. Both acts are in eternity and both are shown through time, like a song which has been learned, is known all at once and yet is stretched out. But when this is known, then the timeless and the temporal song become one in the form of a psalm, giving Augustine the whole in the very image he uses. This unified whole allows him to think the object in the image, an activity which the Platonists would judge to be folly.  

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9 The singing of psalms plays an important part in the argument of Book X, 33 for instance in the treatment of hearing and its sins. See also the distinction between song and psalm in the discourse on Psalm 4.  
10 Chadwick brings out the importance of De Musica in Augustine and a hidden affinity (Confessions X, 49) to the soul. Augustine, H. Chadwick, Oxford University Press., 1986, pp. 44-45. The work is also related to Book XI by Robert J. O'Connell, Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine, Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 94.  
11 Thus I find at this point and in the Confessions as a whole the total mediation of his relation to God, as James Doull brings out in "Augustinian Trinitarianism and Existential Theology", Dionysius, III, 1979, p 150.